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eg.

Today’s Forest Service is increasingly more cognizant of the non-extractive uses and
values of national forests, and under the current regime of “ecosystem management,”
seeks to integrate biological and human uses of natural resources in order to allow
resource extraction while minimizing loss of biodiversity. A primary component o f
ecosystem management is analyzing the effects of management activities on a variety
o f scales, including landscape, watershed, and project levels, tlrrough species surveys
and monitoring. It follows that establishing an ecological baseline prior to any
management activity is essential to analysis of the actual effects of that activity and to
determining the probable consequences of such activities in the future.
Federal recognition of the importance of surveying and monitoring is now embodied
in national environmental acts governing public lands and their implementing
regulations, as well as within each forest’s individual land and resource management
plan, all of which require collection and consideration of this information. However,
environmentalists and federal cases suggest that the Forest Service, and other federal
land management agencies, frequently ignore or inadequately perform these
requirements. While enforcement of these regulations cannot insure the Agency will
make the most environmentally sound decision in each instance, it makes it more
likely, and provides environmental plaintiffs grounds on which to challenge poor and
unsupportable decisions.
Numerous judicial challenges attempting to force the Forest Service to adequately
perform the species surveying and monitoring requirements contained in federal
enviromnental laws and individual forest plans have turned primarily on the
application of two legal concepts. First, the judicial doctrine of ripeness and the
associated requirement o f final agency action governs the point at which a court may
decide a controversy. Second, the concept of agency discretion determines the degree
to which a court must defer to a land management agency’s scientific expertise and its
interpretation of its regulations. While the success of the these challenges in federal
courts has been inconsistent, this paper argues that judicial enforcement o f monitoring
requirements against federal land management agencies is proper, and remains a
legally viable method to ensure that federal agencies make fully informed resource
development decisions that consider and protect habitat, species, and biodiversity on
our public lands.
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1.

Introduction
In the wake o f World War II, the United States Forest Service became the

principal supplier o f an enormous demand for timber.' One result o f the Agency’s focus
on timber harvest was an unprecedented decline in the diversity o f plant and animal life
within national forests,^ This decline is primarily due to the destruction o f habitat
resulting from timber harvest and the Forest Service’s attempt to meet its dual mandates
of production and preservation through intensive management activities.^ In addition to
the inherent existence value o f individual species, scientists realize the importance o f
maintaining biodiversity since they do not fully understand the role o f each species in or its importance to —the ecosystem as a whole.'* Over 50 years ago, Aldo Leopold
recognized the need to maintain biodiversity when he noted that the first rule o f the
tinkerer is to keep all o f the pieces.^
Today’s Forest Service is increasingly more cognizant o f the non-extractive uses
and values of national forests, and under the current regime o f “ecosystem management,’’
seeks to integrate biological and human uses o f natural resources in order to allow

' H arvest lev els on federal forests increased 800% (from 1.5 to 11.5 billion board feet per year) betw een
1947 and 1971. D avid W. Crumpacker, P ro sp ects f o r Su stain ability o f B io d iversity B a sed on C onservation
B io lo g y a n d U.S. F o rest S ervice A pproach es to E cosystem M anagem ent, 40 LANDSCAPE AND URBAN
P l a n n i n g 47, 58 (1998); a n d s e e g en erally Paul W . Hirt, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIM ISM : M a n a g e m e n t o f
THE N a t i o n a l F o r e s t s s i n c e W o r l d W a r T w o , (U niversity o f Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1994), a n d
Charles F, W ilkinson and M ichael H. A nderson, L a n d AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE N a t i o n a l
F o r e s t s , (Island Press, 1987).
^ Id. ; a n d s e e g e n e ra lly Edward O. W ilson, T H E DIVERSITY OF L i f e , 259 ( 1992).
^ W ilson, su p ra note 2 at 253-54; D avid S. W ilcove et al.. Q uantifying Threats to Im periled Species in the
U n ited States, 4 8 B IO S C IE N C E 607, 609 (1998). In Federal Register notices, habitat loss is alm ost
invariably cited as one o f the primary reason for determinations o f threatened status o f various species
under the Endangered Sp ecies Act.
“ See g en era lly. C r e a t i n g a F o r e s t r y f o r THE 2 U ^ CENTURY: T H E SCIENCE OF ECOSYSTEM
M a n a g e m e n t , Kathryn A . K ohm & Jerry F. Franklin, eds. (1997).
^ A ldo Leopold, A S a n d COUNTY ALM ANAC AND SKETCHES H ER E AND TH ER E (N ew York: Oxford
U niversity Press, 1949).
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resource extraction while minimizing loss of biodiversity.^ A primary component o f
ecosystem management is analyzing the effects of management activities on a variety o f
scales, including landscape, watershed, and project levels, through species surveys and
monitoring.^ It follows that establishing an ecological baseline prior to any management
activity is essential to analysis o f the actual effects of that activity and to determining the
probable consequences o f such activities in the future.
Federal recognition o f the importance o f surveying and monitoring is now
embodied in national environmental acts governing public lands and their implementing
regulations, as well as within each forest’s individual land and resource management plan
(LRMP), all of which require collection and consideration of this information. However,
environmentalists and the cases discussed below suggest that the Forest Service, and
other federal land management agencies, frequently ignore or inadequately perform these
requirements.* While enforcement of these regulations cannot insure the Agency will
make the most environmentally sound decision in each instance, it makes it more likely,
and provides environmental plaintiffs grounds on which to challenge poor and
unsupportable decisions.
Numerous judicial challenges attempting to force the Forest Service to adequately

* Peter F. Brussard et al., E cosystem M anagem ent: What is it Really?^ 40 L a n d s c a p e a n d U r b a n
P l a n n i n g 9, 10 (1998).
’ Forest Ecosystem M anagem ent A ssessm ent Team, F o r e s t E c o s y s t e m M a n a g e m e n t : A n E c o l o g i c a l ,
E c o n o m i c , a n d S o c i a l A s s e s s m e n t , V III-14 (1993); see also W illiam T. Secton & Robert C. Szaro,
Im plem enting E cosystem M anagem ent: Using M ultiple Boundaries f o r O rganizing Information, 40
L a n d s c a p e a n d URBAN P l a n n in g 1 6 7 ,1 6 9 (1 9 9 8 ).
* Interview w ith Jeff Juel o f the E cology Center, Decem ber 6, 2000 (indicating that the monitoring in most
R egion I forests is inadequate at best, and noting that under the current state o f the law in this Circuit,
environm ental groups are required to mount multiple tim ber-sale-specific challenges to inadequate
monitoring; w hich are expensive, tim e-consum ing, and beyond the resources o f most enviromnental
groups).
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perform the species surveying and monitoring requirements contained in federal
environmental laws and individual forest plans have turned primarily on the application
o f two legal concepts. First, the judicial doctrine o f ripeness and the associated
requirement of final agency action governs the point at which a court may decide a
controversy. Second, the concept o f agency discretion determines the degree to which a
court must defer to a land management agency’s scientific expertise and its interpretation
o f its regulations. While the success of the these challenges in federal courts has been
inconsistent, this paper argues that judicial enforcement of monitoring requirements
against federal land management agencies is proper, and remains a legally viable method
to ensure that federal agencies make fully informed resource development decisions that
consider and protect habitat, species, and biodiversity on our public lands.
Section two of this paper provides background on monitoring requirements,
discussing the science and policy behind them, and the statutory framework out o f which
they arise and in which they operate. The third section discusses the primary procedural
barrier to the judicial enforcement of monitoring requirements, the doctrine o f ripeness
and the requirement o f final agency action, as applied by the United States Supreme
Court in a recent challenge to the substance of a forest plan. Section three also examines
the facts, issues and holdings of recent cases involving judicial challenges to inadequate
monitoring by federal land management agencies. In section four, this paper addresses
the concept o f agency deference, which has emerged as the primary substantive grounds
for some courts’ refusal to strictly enforce monitoring requirements. This section also
examines how the standard of review was applied in recent federal cases involving Forest
Service failures to monitor. Finally, this paper concludes that the better reasoned federal
3
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court decisions hold that challenges to agency noncompliance with species monitoring
requirements are ripe for judicial review as final agency actions or failures to act; and that
while an agency is entitled to deference in interpreting and carrying out these regulations,
an agency’s failure to collect the required data is contrary to the law and renders arbitrary
and capricious any decision based on inadequate data. Such a conclusion is proper in
light o f the policy and science behind monitoring requirements, and the precedent and
reasoning o f federal case law.
II.

Monitoring Requirements
A.

The Science of Monitoring

Scientists agree that under our stewardship, or lack o f it, species are going extinct
at a rate far in excess of normal background evolutionary extinction rates - up to 100,000
times normal rates in the most species-rich tropical forests.^ While there are many
anthropogenic causes o f species loss, habitat destruction is often cited as the primary
culprit, and timber harvest poses a serious threat to species survival through forest and
stream habitat destruction and fragm entation.E ffective forest management practices
can minimize the effects of logging on forest species by maintaining diverse and healthy
plant and animal populations. ‘'
Maintaining diversity means more than preserving the number o f different species
present in an area —a concept known as “species richness.”'^ Maintaining diversity also

®Gary K. M effe & C. Ronald Carroll, PRINCIPLES OF C o n s e r v a t i o n B i o l o g y 110 (1994); an d W ilson,
supra note 2 at 280.
M effe & Carroll, su pra note 9 at 237.
" Greg D. Corbin, The U nited S tates F orest S e n ic e R esponse to B iodiversity Science, 29 E n v t l . L. 377,
3 7 9 (1 9 9 9 )
Id. at 393-94.
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requires maintaining “species viability,” an abundance o f individuals within a species, in
order to guard against the loss of the individual species.'^ Effective forest management
requires consideration o f both measures, as changes in species richness may indicate loss
o f especially sensitive species, and changes in species viability may signal that
disturbances have affected individual species within an area.'" Further, genetic diversity
within species is important to species’ ability to adapt to environmental changes and
resist the deleterious genetic effects of shrinking populations.'* Finally, understanding
the roles o f individual species within a larger community is necessary to preserving
biodiversity by maintaining the ecosystem upon which all species in it rely.'*
One scientifically recognized method o f monitoring and preserving biodiversity is
population viability analysis (PVA). PVA incorporates many levels of biodiversity,
including genetic and species diversity, habitat needs, spatial distribution, inter and intra
population dynamics, and environmental influences on the continued existence of a
population.'^ Once factors critical to a populations’ survival are determined, forest
managers can estimate how many reproductive individuals are necessaiy to maintain
diverse and healthy populations.'*

While performing PVA for every species present in

a forest is beyond the mandate, economic and logistic capabilities of the Forest Service,
conducting PVA for a few “indicator species” is not. The indicator species concept, or
“management indicator species” in Forest Service parlance, assumes that effects of

” Id. at 394.

'Ud.
M effe & Carroll supra note 9 at 153-58.
Corbin su pra note 11 at 396.
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management activities on a single species can be extrapolated to determine probable
effects on the rest o f the ecosystem/^ While not without its critics and some degree o f
uncertainty, this approach allows forest managers to focus on well-chosen species or
groups o f species to understand and predict the effects o f management d e c i s i o n s . I t is
axiomatic that monitoring the effects o f forest management practices on biodiversity is
essential to determine their efficacy and to make meaningful changes in those practices.^'
One basic tenet o f PVA for any species is that whether attempting complex mathematical
models o f population dynamics or estimating the effects of habitat manipulation,
accepted scientific methods require some estimate o f population size, if not more detailed
information.^^
Forest Service regulations and forest plans promulgated under those regulations
require the Agency to maintain viable wildlife populations, and identify and collect data
for management indicator species, as explained below. However, when the Forest
Service finds itself with more to do than its staff or budget will allow, rather than spend
precious resources collecting new information, the Agency often attempts to make
management decisions based on data it already has.^^ This was the case when the Forest
Service rejected the scientifically accepted methodology o f PVA in favor of its own
approach - habitat viability analysis.^'^
This method allows the forest service to use data regarding habitat types already

Id. at 397.
-'‘ Id.
W ilkinson & Anderson, supra note 1 at 304.
Corbin, su pra note 11 at 401.
‘^Andrew Orleman, D o the P ro p o se d F orest Service R egulations P ro te ct B iodiversity? An A nalysis o f the
Continuing Viability o f "H abitat Viability Analysis," 2 0 J. L a n d R e s o u r c e s & E n v t l . L . 3 5 7 , 3 6 1 ( 2 0 0 0 ) .
S ee Sections III. E. and IV. D.
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gathered through timber resource inventories, and information regarding habitat
requirements of individual species.^^ The Forest Service then extrapolates the number o f
individuals in a population from the numbers o f acres o f suitable habitat within the
planning area.^^ The Agency would then look at the number o f acres o f suitable habitat
that would remain after a specific management prescription (e.g. timber sale) in order to
determine whether or not the population would remain viable.^^
While this method may be less expensive and acceptable to the Agency and some
courts, it ignores the fact that “[s]trictly as a matter o f science, however, the Forest
Service’s ‘habitat viability analysis’ violates the most basic understanding that to
determine population viability o f individual species requires data on the population’s
status.”^*
B.

Statutory Framework and Policy of Monitoring
1.

National Environmental Policy Act

Due largely to growing public concern over the clearcutting of national forests,
environmental groups in the late-1960s pursued change in Forest Service management
practices; but convinced it was unlikely to come from the legislative or executive
branches, they increasingly turned to the courts in their attempts to stop destructive
management activities and to defend non-timber uses and values o f forest lands.
These groups received an unexpected gift at the outset o f the Nixon

Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Service, 88 F.3d 754, 759 (9'*’ Cir. 1996).
Id.
" M at 758.
Corbin, su pra note 11 at 401 (citing M ichael L. Morrison et al., W ildlife-habitat Relationships 251
(1 9 9 2 )).
Hirt, su pra note 1 at 253.
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administration, in the form o f the National Environmental Policy Act o f 1969 (NEPA)/°
which significantly increased environmentalists’ ability to sue the Forest Service over
management decisions/' NEPA is a procedural statute that provides for government
analysis and public scrutiny o f the environmental impacts o f agency decisionmaking,
with the stated purpose o f ensuring the environmental effects o f agency actions are
revealed and accommodated before those actions are undertaken/^
To further this purpose, NEPA imposes certain pre-decision information gathering
obligations on all agencies o f the federal government/^ The most well known requires
preparation o f an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before undertaking any major
federal action that significantly effects the environment/'' NEPA also requires federal
agencies “utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use o f the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in
decisionmaking which may have an impact on m an’s environment.’’^^ In the mandate
most related to monitoring requirements, NEPA says agencies shall “initiate and utilize
ecological information in the planning and development o f resource-oriented projects.
NEPA also created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to “formulate
and recommend national policies to promote the improvement o f the quality o f the
environment.’’^’ The CEQ regulations address federal agency methodology and scientific

“ 4 2 U .S.C . §§ 4321 to 4370d (1994).
16
" 16
42
” 42
42
” 42

U .S.C .
U .S.C .
U .S.C .
U .S.C .
U .S.C .
U .S.C .

§
§
§
§
§
§

1604(g)(1) (1994).
4 3 3 2 (2 ) (1994).
4 332(2)(C ) (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997).
4 3 3 2 (2 )(A ) (1994).
4 3 3 2(2)(H ) (1994).
4 3 4 2 (1 9 9 4 ).
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accuracy in the context o f EISs, stating “[ajgencies shall insure the professional integrity,
including scientific integrity, o f the discussions and analyses in [EISs] . . , shall identify
any methodologies used and shall make explicit reference . . . to scientific and other
sources relied upon for conclusions.”^*
On their face, NEPA and the CEQ regulations require the Forest Service to gather
and utilize scientifically supportable data prior to making forest management decisions.
However, little is made o f these mandates in federal court cases that defer to the Forest
Service decisions based upon inadequate scientific methods or a total lack o f credible
monitoring data.
2.

National Forest Management Act

A few years after the passage o f NEPA, the Forest Service’s current system o f
forest planning was initiated in the Resources Planning Act o f 1974,^^ and was eventually
amended by the National Forest Management Act o f 1976 (NFMA)."*® NFMA is the
principal statute governing administration o f the National Forests. It imposes numerous
substantive management requirements, as well as a planning process incorporating the
Resources Planning Act’s mandate that the Forest Service develop integrated LRMPs for
each unit o f the National Forest System.'"
LRMPs, commonly known as forest plans, are analogous to city zoning
regulations, because they identify appropriate uses for different areas within a national

3*40 C.F.R. § 1502.24.
” K elly Murphy, C utting Through the F orest o f the Standing D octrine: Challenging R esource
M an agem ent P lan s in the Eighth a n d Ninth Circuits, 18 U . A r k . LITTLE R o C K L.J. 223, 228-234 (1996);
Paul A . Garrahan, F ailin g to S ee the F orest f o r the Trees: Standing to C hallenge N ational F orest
M an agem ent P lans, 16 V a . E n v t l . L.J. 145, 1 4 7 -4 9 (1 9 9 6 ).
16 U .S.C . § § 1600-1614 (1994).
16 U .S.C . § 1604(a) (1994).
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forest, but do not necessarily instigate any activities. Once approved, the plan is binding
on all management activities within a forest until revised.'*^ Revision is required at least
every fifteen years, or more often as needed."*^ NFMA also requires that the Forest
Service comply with NEPA,'*^ and mandates an EIS accompany every forest plan.'*^
Among its substantive requirements, NFMA declares that the Forest Service must
“provide for diversity o f plant and animal communities,""^ and must gather inventory and
monitoring data."^ NFMA also established a process to continually evaluate forest plans
for consistency with contemporary scientific understanding, and required input fi'om a
Committee of Scientists in promulgating regulations to implement the diversity and
monitoring requirements."®
To implement the diversity requirement, current Forest Service regulations state
that:
Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations
o f existing native and desired non-native species in the planning area. For
planning purposes, a viable population shall be regarded as one which has
estimated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure
its continued existence is well distributed in the planning area. In order to
insure that viable populations will be maintained, habitat must be provided
to support, at least, a minimum number o f reproductive individuals and
that habitat must be well distributed so that those individuals can interact
with others in the planning area."^

« 16 U .S.C . § 1604(1) (1994).
16 U .S.C . § 1 6 0 4 (0 (5 ) (1994).
42 U .S.C . § § 4 3 2 1 -4 3 7 0 (1994).
16 U .S.C . § 1604(g)(1) (1994).
16 U .S.C . § 1604(g)(3)(B ) (1994).
16 U .S.C . § 1604(g)(2)(B ) (1994).
16 U .S.C . §§ 1604 (0 (3 ), (5), and (h)(1).
36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000). S ee also 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(a)(6) (2000) (providing that “A ll managem ent
prescriptions s h a ll. . . [pjrovide for adequate fish and w ildlife habitat to maintain viable populations o f
existing native vertebrate species and provide that habitat for species chosen under § 219.19 is maintained
and im proved to the degree consistent with m ultiple-use objectives.”).

10
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This regulation identifies two measurements o f viability in the planning area: first,
sufficient numbers o f reproducing individuals; and second, well distributed habitat/^
Recognizing that the Forest Service did not have the means to monitor these parameters
for every species in the 191 million acre National Forest System, the regulations require
that “[i]n order to estimate the effeets o f each [management] alternative on fish and
wildlife populations,” the Forest Service “shall” designate M IS /' Further, the 219
regulations state, “[pjlanning alternatives shall be stated and evaluated in terms o f both
amount and quality o f habitat and o f animal population trends of the management
indicator species,”^^ and that “[pjopulation trends of the management indicator species
will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes determined.”^^ Again, these
regulations treat evaluation and monitoring o f habitat and populations as separate and
distinet requirements.
Embodying the Committee of Scientists’ recognition that “[n]o plan is better that
the resource inventory data that support it,”^'*the regulations also state “[ijventories shall
include quantitative data making possible the evaluation o f diversity in terms o f its prior
and present condition.”^^
Despite the Committee o f Scientists’ recognition of the need for actual population
data and constant updating o f scientific methodology, federal court deference to the
Agency’s creative interpretations o f the regulations have allowed the Forest Service to

Corbin, su p ra note 11 at 389.
3 6 C.F.R. § 2 1 9 .19(a)(1) (2000).
" 3 6 C.F.R. § 2 1 9 .19(a)(2) (2 0 0 0 ) em phasis supplied.
” 3 6 C.F.R. § 2 1 9 .19(a)(6) (2000).
N ational Forest System Land and Resource M anagement Planning, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,554, 26,608 (M ay 4,
1979).
” 3 6 C .F .R . § 2 1 9 .2 6 (2 0 0 0 ).
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fudge or ignore its mandate to gather the kind o f data that would enable the Agency to
utilize modem techniques like PVA. Now, the upcoming adoption o f the proposed 219
regulations will codify the Agency’s less accurate and assumption-loaded concept o f
“habitat viability analysis.”^^ This will allow the Forest Service free reign to legally
employ a methodology, that may or may not fulfill NFM A’s mandate to preserve and
promote biodiversity, in forest plans updated under the new regulations.^^ However,
forest plans promulgated under the current regulations will still be governed by them for
years to come,^® and federal court enforcement o f their monitoring requirements could
protect biodiversity on hundreds o f thousands o f acres, and provide a yardstick with
which to compare the effects o f the new regulations.
3.

Administrative Procedure Act

Neither NFMA nor NEPA contain a citizen suit provision, which allows
concerned citizens and groups representing their interests to seek judicial enforcement of
these acts’ requirements. Therefore, judicial review o f agency decisions under these acts
is accomplished through provisions o f the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).^’
Section 10(a) of the APA provides that “a person suffering a legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning o f
the relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.’’^®
The APA incorporates the judicial doctrine of “ripeness” by allowing judicial

S ee g en era lly Orleman, su pra note 23.
" 36 C.F.R. § 2 1 9 .2 9 (2 0 0 0 ).
5 U .S.C . § § 551 -5 5 9 , 7 0 1 -7 0 6 (1994).
bO 5 U .S.C . § 702 (1 9 9 4 & Supp. Ill 1997).
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review o f agency action only when it is a “final agency action.”** The Supreme Court
recently stated two conditions that must be met for an administrative action to be
considered final under the APA: (1) the action should mark the consummation o f the
agency’s decisionmaking process, and (2) the action should be one by which rights or
obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences flow,*^ Agency
failures to act are also reviewable,*^ and courts may compel “agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”***
The APA also addresses the appropriate standard under which courts review
agencies’ actions and interpretations o f their regulations. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA
directs the reviewing court to set aside agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse o f discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”**
The following section examines cases challenging agency failures to adequately
follow the monitoring and surveying requirements o f NFMA and individual LRMPs,
where some federal courts have invoked the judicial doctrine o f ripeness, as interpreted
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Ohio Forestry Ass ’n v. Sierra C/w6,** and held
that inadequate monitoring is not a final agency action or failure to act.*’ Some of these
decisions also suggest that agencies are entitled to substantial deference in interpreting
the monitoring and surveying requirements, and that this deference allows the agencies to

5 U .S.C . § 7 0 4 ( 1 9 9 4 ) .
“ B ennett v. Spear, 5 20 U .S. 154, 177 (1997).
S ee 5 U .S.C . § 551(13) (1994) (expanding the definition o f “agency action” to include a “failure to act”).
See also 5 U .S.C . § 7 0 6 (2 )(A ) (1994) (allow ing courts to find an agen cy’s failure to act “arbitrary and
capricious).
5 U .S.C . § 7 06(1) (1 9 9 4 & Supp. Ill 1997).
5 U .S.C . § 706(2)(A ).
^ 523 U.S. 7 2 6 (1 9 9 8 ).
Sierra Club v. P eterson, 2000 W L 1357506 (5*^ Cir. 2000); Ecology’ C enter v. U nited States F orest
S ervice, 192 F.3d 922 (9* Cir. 1999).
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inadequately comply with or ignore these requirements altogether.®*
Other federal court decisions have held that challenges to agency noncompliance
with species monitoring requirements are ripe for review as final agency actions or
failures to act, and that while the agency is entitled to deference in interpreting these
regulations, the agency’s failure to collect the required data rendered arbitrary and
capricious any decisions based on the absent or inadequate data.®^
III.

Ohio Forestry - Ripeness and Final Agency Action
A.

Introduction

In Ohio Forestry, t w o environmental groups challenged the U.S. Forest Service's
Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP) for the Wayne National Forest in Ohio,
claiming that it allowed too much logging and clearcutting.^' An association o f forest
industry interests, intervening on behalf o f the Forest Service, claimed that the plan itself
did not initiate specific timber sales, and thus was not ripe for review.’^ On May 18,
1998, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision, written by Justice Breyer, held the
challenge was not ripe and thereby limited the availability of judicial review o f Forest
Service LRMPs under the ripeness doctrine.
Despite the limitations placed on challenges to forest plans by the Ohio Forestry
holding, dicta specifically identified two types o f challenges the Court would consider

Id.
S ierra C lub v. M artin, 168 F.3d 1(11'*' Cir, 1999); Sierra Club v. P eterson, 185 F.3d 349 (5'*’ Cir. 1999)
reversed after rehearing en banc; O regon N atural Resources Council Action v. U nited States F orest
S ervice, 192 F.Supp.2d 1085 (W .D . Wash. 1999); P acific C oast F e d ’n o f Fishermen
'n v. N ational
M arine F isheries Service, 71 F.Supp.2d 1063 (W .D. Wash. 1999).
™ 1 1 8 S . Ct. 1 6 6 5 (1 9 9 8 ).
’ * Id. at 1669.
” Id. at 1670.
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ripe for judicial review: procedural claims, and substantive claims alleging site-specific
and imminent harm. However, recent federal district and appellate court decisions
demonstrate that questions remain as to the Ohio Forestry ruling’s effect on monitoring
challenges involving LRMPs.
This section provides background on the ripeness doctrine, and previous cases
challenging forest plans, then examines the Wayne National Forest case in detail. An
analysis of the decision’s implications follows, illustrated by recent cases that interpret
Ohio Forestry. This section concludes that recent decisions by lower courts are
inconsistent in their characterization of claims as either procedural or substantive. Courts
also misconstrue Ohio Forestry to require site-specific allegations in procedural claims,
as well as claims alleging substantive defects in a plan. In light o f Ohio Forestry, courts
should consider ripe claims o f procedural defects in agencies’ compliance with
monitoring requirements in regulations and LRMPs, without requiring allegations of
imminent site-specific injuries. This section concludes that in such cases, reliance on
Ohio Forestry is misplaced and serves only to confuse the issue.
B.

Background
1.

The Ripeness Doctrine

Ripeness and the related doctrine of standing are concepts of justiciability that
limit access to courts by requiring a determination of “whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits o f the dispute or of particular issues.’’^" The source of

Paul A. Garrahan, F ailing to See the F orest f o r the Trees: Standing to Challenge N ational F orest
M anagem ent Plans, 16 V a . ENV TL. L.J. 145, 158-59 (1996) (quoting Warth v . Seldin, 422 U .S. 490, 498
(1974)).
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both doctrines is disputed, but standing is now generally accepted as a non-discretionary
requirement o f the “case or controversy” element in Article III o f the Constitution/^
Though ripeness is frequently associated with Article III, it is often characterized by the
Supreme Court as a prudential and discretionary limit/^ Since the Court addresses the
ripeness issue but declines discussion of standing in line with its practice o f not deciding
cases on constitutional grounds when discretionary limitations are available, Ohio
Forestry supports the proposition that ripeness is a prudential and discretionary
limitation/^
Despite their sources, the doctrines of standing and ripeness are so closely related
that “[f]ew courts draw meaningful distinctions between the two.”^* One reason for this
confusion is that tests for the justiciability o f a controversy under both doctrines initially
address the imminence o f injury to the plaintiff in similar terms/® The important
distinction between the two is that standing determines the proper party to bring suit,
where ripeness determines the proper time to bring suit/® Some courts recognize the
ripeness doctrine is more appropriate to determine the justiciability o f injuries that have
not yet occurred/'
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner is the leading case on the ripeness doctrine as

at 159.
G ene R. N ichol, Jr., R ipeness a n d the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. RJEV. 153, 155 (1987).
” Steven P. Quarles & ITiomas R. Lundquist, The Suprem e Court R estricts A vailability o f Judicial R eview
in O hio F orestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 28 E n v t l . L. R e p . 10621, 10626 (1998) (citing Ohio F orestry, 52 3
U .S. 732). Quarles represented the petitioner, Ohio Forestry A ssociation, in Ohio Forestry.
W ilderness Soc'y v. A lcock, 83 F.3d 386, 389 (11^ Cir. 1996).
Id. at 390. For Exam ple, one prong o f the standing test requires the injury be “actual or im m inent,” and
the traditional ripeness test requires it be immediate or imminently threatened.
““ M

" Id.
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applied to challenges to administrative a c t i o n s . T h e Court stated “its basic rationale is
to prevent the courts, through avoidance o f premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized
and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.

The Court also stated a

two-prong test for deciding whether an agency’s decision is ripe for judicial review,
requiring evaluation o f both “the fitness o f the issue for judicial decision, and the
hardship to the parties o f withholding court consideration.”*'*
2.

Judicial Climate Prior to Ohio Forestry

In 1990 the Supreme Court in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation*^ construed
the allowable scope o f judicial review under the APA of public land management plans.**
Lujan involved an environmental group’s challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's
(BLM) land withdrawal review program.*’ The complaint was based on alleged
violations to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976** (FLPMA) and
NEPA. Like NFMA, FLPMA provides no private right o f action for violations o f its
provisions, so plaintiffs in Lujan sought judicial review under section 10(a) o f the APA.*^
The Court addressed the ripeness of this challenge, and held the program was not “agency
action” or “final agency action,” within the meaning of the APA.^”

*-387 U .S. 1 3 6 (1 9 6 7 ).
** Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.
4 9 7 U .S. 871 (1990).
** Beth Brennan & Matt Clifford, Standing, Ripeness, an d F orest Plan A ppeals, 17 PUB. L a n d &
R e s o u r c e s L. R e v . 1 2 5 ,1 3 3 -3 5 (1996).
Lujan, 497 U .S. at 875.
** 43 U .S.C . § § 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Lujan, 497 U .S. at 882.
Id. at 890.
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The Court reasoned that the program “does not refer to a single BLM order or
regulation, or even to a completed universe o f BLM orders and regulations,” but refers to
“the continuing (and thus constantly changing) operations of BLM.”^' The decision
stated “a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type o f agency action ripe for review
under the APA until the scope o f the controversy has been reduced to more manageable
proportions and its factual components fleshed out by some concrete action applying the
regulation to the claimant’s situation in a fashion that harms or threatens him.”^^
A major exception noted in Lujan “is a substantive rule which as a practical
matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately,” and stated that this type
o f agency action is ripe for review.” The “case-by-case approach that this requires is
understandably frustrating to [environmental organizations seeking] across-the-board
protection o f [natural resources],” but, the Court stated, such a limitation is the
“traditional” and “normal mode o f operation o f the courts.”^'* The Court said that unless
Congress specifically provides for judicial review “at a higher level of generality, we
intervene . . . only when . . . a specific ‘final agency action’ has an actual or immediately
threatened effect.”’^
By the mid-1990s the federal appeals courts’ varying interpretations o f Lujan

at 891.
” Id (citing A b b o tt Lab., 387 U .S. at 152-54).
Id. at 894.
Id. (citing Gardner v. Toilet G oods Ass'n, 387 U .S. 167, 164-66 (1967)).
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resulted in an even circuit split regarding the reviewability o f LRMPs.’^ The Seventh^’
and Ninth Circuits^* upheld such challenges, holding that the controversies were ripe for
review because the plans were final, appealable, and presented threats of actual and
imminent harm. The Eighth^’ and Eleventh Circuits'®'’ denied the justiciability o f such
claims on standing and ripeness grounds, finding the plans were merely advisory
documents intended to guide site-specific decisions, and that allegations of injury were
speculative prior to site-specific implementation of the plans. This was the unsettled state
o f the law regarding the ripeness of LRMP challenges when the Wayne National Forest
controversy reached the Sixth Circuit,'®' and is likely the reason the Supreme Court
accepted this case for review.
C,

Ohio Forestry

The planning process for the Wayne National Forest began in 1981.'®^ Two
environmental groups, the Sierra Club and the Citizens Council on Conservation and

Garrahan, supra note 72, at 172-74; Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 75, at 10622; Brennan & Clifford,
supra note 84 at 141-48; and M iles A. Yanick, Loss o f P rotection as Injury in Fact: An A pproach to
E stablishing Standing to Challenge Environm ental Planning D ecisions, 29 U. M ich. J.L. Ref. 857, 865873 (1996).
Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7* Cir. 1995). The court held a forest plan and its EIS were ripe for
review because they could cause imminent harm, regardless o f their programmatic nature. Id. at 613-14.
Further, the court distinguished Lujan on the basis that here the Forest Service had issued a final,
appealable plan. W. at 614.
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9“' Cir. 1992). This court similarly distinguished
Lujan on both standing and ripeness grounds. See Id. at 1513-19. See also Resources Ltd., Inc. v.
Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9* Cir. 1993) (reversing the lower courts holding that the challenged LRMP was
not ripe for review because there was no “actual or imm ediately threatened effect”); and Seattle Audubon
Soc'y V. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9"' Cir. 1993) (finding that w hile logging m ight not occur under the plan,
potential harm to p laintiffs aesthetic and scientific interests in ow ls that inhabit the forest constituted
imminent injury).
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8* Cir. 1994). Here the court found the LRMP was a
programmatic document that did not “effectuate any on-the-ground environmental consequences,” and
noted that events w ould occur betw een the plan and site-specific projects, making any injury from the plan
m erely speculative. Id. at 758.
W ilderness Soc'y. 83 F.3d 386 (holding that the LRMP was not ripe for review prior to a second stage
site-specific decision).
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6 ‘^ Cir. 1997), rev'd and vacated by Ohio Forestry, 523 U .S. 726
(1998).
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 489 (S.D . Ohio 1994), rev'd bv Sierra Club v. Thomas. 105
F.3d 248 (6'^ Cir. 1997).
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Environmental Control participated in the planning process and the public comment
period following publication o f the proposed Plan and the draft EIS.'°^ In 1988, the
Forest Service adopted the final plan and accompanying final E IS.'^ Both groups
complained of the Plan’s designation o f suitable timber lands and harvest methods, and
appealed the adoption o f the Plan through administrative channels.'”^ The Chief of the
Forest Service denied the groups’ appeals in 1992 and affirmed adoption of the Plan, so
they instigated legal action two months later.
The complaint included three counts.

First, the groups alleged that approval of

a plan that permits below-cost timber sales accomplished by clearcutting violates NFMA,
NEPA, and the APA.’°* Second, they claimed that by permitting below-cost timber sales,
the Forest Service violated its duty as public t r u s t e e s . T h i r d , the plaintiffs alleged that
by selecting lands suitable for timber production, the Forest Service followed regulations
that failed to properly identify “economically unsuitable lands’’ and such lands were
placed into a category where logging could take place."*’ Thus the regulations violated
NFMA and the APA as an arbitrary and capricious abuse o f discretion, not in accordance
with law. ‘' '
The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the plan and the below-cost
timber sales and clearcutting it authorized are unlawful, and sought an injunction
prohibiting the Forest Service from allowing further timber harvest or below-cost timber

Id.
Id.
w 'A i
Id.
Ohio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 731.
Id.

110Id.
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sales pending revision of the Plan."^
1.

Procedural History

At the district court level, the parties did not raise the issue of justiciability, and in
Sierra Club v. Robertson, Judge James L. Graham granted summary judgment for the
Forest Service on the merits.” ^ Judge Graham held the plaintiffs “failed to show that in
adopting the plan for the Wayne [National Forest], the Forest Service acted arbitrarily or
capriciously or that the plan is contrary to the law.”” '*
The plaintiffs appealed, and in Sierra Club v. Thomas the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed and joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, in holding that Forest
Service LRMPs are ripe for judicial review.” ^ The decision first addressed the threshold
issue o f justiciability with a discussion o f standing.*'^ The court stated that “[i]n cases
involving Land Resource Management Plans, the most controverted standing issue is
whether injury is imminent.”" ’ The Sixth Circuit determined LRMPs “represent
significant and concrete decisions that play a critical role in future Forest Service
actions,” and stated that if the plaintiffs were only allowed to challenge the plan at the
site-specific stage, “then the meaningful citizen participation contemplated by the
[NFMA] would forever escape review.”'** Then, specifically addressing the ripeness of
the controversy, the decision concluded “[p]laintiffs need not wait to challenge a specific
project when their grievance is with an overall plan.”"^
Turning to the merits o f the plaintiffs first and third claims, the court found that

R obertson, 845 F. Supp. at 489.
at 503.
Thomas, 105 F.3d at 250.
" " M at 250.
117
Id.
Id. (quoting Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516).
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the Forest Service’s planning process was “improperly predisposed toward clearcutting”
and the resulting plan was “arbitrary and capricious because it is based upon this artificial
narrowing o f options.”’^® The decision then engaged in an extraordinary analysis of the
planning process, accusing the Forest Service o f maintaining political and economic
biases in favor of timber production and undervaluing primitive recreational uses.'^‘ In a
concurring opinion. Judge Batchelder said “speculation about the motives and biases of
the Forest Service, even if accurate, is unnecessary, and therefore, ought not to be voiced
in this opinion.”'^^ In conclusion, the court found the Forest Service “failed to comply
with the protective spirit o f the [NFMA],” and that this noncompliance violated section
1604(g)(3)(F)(v) of the Act.'^^
2.

Supreme Court Decision

The Ohio Forestry Association was an intervenor-defendant in both lower court
cases, but maintained a low profile until the appellate court’s decision raised the stakes
for the logging i n d u s t r y . T h e Ohio Forestry Assoeiation petitioned for a writ o f
certiorari over the objections of the plaintiffs and surprisingly, the Forest Service, whieh
argued against Supreme Court review on procedural g r o u n d s . T h e Supreme Court
granted certiorari in October, 1997, to determine whether the dispute presented a
justiciable controversy, and if so, whether the LRMP conformed to statutory and
regulatory requirements.'^*^

W. at 251.
Id. at 251-52,
Id. (Batchelder, J., concurring).
Id. at 252. See 16 U .S.C . § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v) (requiring even-aged management practices (i.e.
clearcutting) be used in national forests only when consistent with the protection o f soil, watershed, fish,
w ildlife, recreation, and aesthetic resources, and the regeneration o f the timber resource).
Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 75, at 10624.
O hio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 732.
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In briefs and at oral argument, the Forest Service realigned itself with the Ohio
Forestry Association and argued that the suit was not justiciable because the plaintiffs
lacked standing and because the dispute over the plan’s specifications for logging and
clearcutting was not yet ripe for judicial r e v i e w . B e c a u s e the Court disagreed with the
Sixth Circuit and held the dispute was not ripe for review, the decision did not discuss
standing or the merits of the case.
3.

Reasoning and Analysis

In reaching its decision in Ohio Forestry, the Court relied primarily on two
important ripeness decisions, Abbott Laboratories^^^ and Lujan}^'^ The Court modified
the two-prong ripeness test from Abbott Laboratories, and distilled it into three factors.
The first factor asks whether delayed review would cause the plaintiff hardship. ' The
second factor requires determination of whether judicial intervention would
inappropriately interfere with further administrative action by the d e f e n d a n t . T h e third
factor asks whether the courts would benefit from further factual development of the
issues presented.
In applying this standard, the Court first found that the plaintiffs failed to show
delayed review would cause them hardship. The Court stated the challenged LRMP does
not “create any adverse effects o f a strictly legal kind, that is, effects of a sort that
traditionally would have qualified as harm,” since LRMPs “do not command anyone to
do anything or to refrain from doing anything.”'^'* To illustrate, the Court said “the Plan

Id.
A b b o tt L ab., m V . S , . 136,
Lujan, A91 U .S. 871.
O hio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 733.
Id.
'»Id
Id. (paraphrasing U .S. v. Los A ngeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U .S. 299, 309-10 (1927)).
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does not give anyone a legal right to cut trees, nor does it abolish anyone's legal authority
to object to trees being cut.” '^^ The Court also found that the plan could not inflict
immediate harm because several steps were required before the Forest Service could
initiate any site-specific activity based on the plan, and plaintiffs could bring a challenge
then.'^^ Plaintiffs contended that the expense of multiple site-specific challenges required
by delayed review, would constitute h a r d s h i p . T h e Court responded that “this kind o f
litigation cost-saving” is insufficient to justify review o f an otherwise unripe case,
because the disadvantages o f premature review outweigh the additional costs.
Second, the Court found immediate review would interfere with further agency
action by hindering the Forest Service’s efforts to refine its policies, correct its own
mistakes, and apply its own expertise.'^’ The Court added that “further consideration will
occur before the Plan is implemented,” and hearing the challenge now would “interfere
with the system that Congress specified for the agency to reach forest logging
decisions.” ’^'®
Third, the Court found immediate review “would require time-consuming judicial
consideration of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan” with effects that may
change over time.’'^’ The decision stated that this is the type of “abstract disagreement
over administrative policies’ that the ripeness doctrine seeks to avoid,” and it would be
best to wait until the controversy was “reduced to more manageable proportions,” and its
“factual components [were] fleshed out” to “significantly advance our ability to deal with

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 734.
at 735. The Court then quoted Lujan for further justification o f the case-by-case approach. Id.
(quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)).
at 735-36.
at 735.
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the legal issues presented."'"^
The Court also addressed the legislative intent behind NFMA, differentiating it
from NEPA and other environmental statutes where Congress has specifically allowed for
judicial review prior to enforcement.'"^ In the judgment o f the Court, Congress had not
provided for pre-implementation judicial review of forest plans.'"" The Ohio Forestry
opinion distinguishes substantive challenges to LRMPs under NFMA from procedural
challenges under NEPA, stating that NEPA “guarantees a particular procedure, not a
specific result.”'"^ The purpose o f NEPA is to insure that environmental effects of
government agency actions are discovered and considered before action is t a k e n . I n
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, the Ninth Circuit illustrated this point,
recognizing that when an agency does not follow procedures required by NEPA, the “risk
that environmental impact will be overlooked” is the injury inflicted.'"^ In Ohio Forestry,
the Court stated that a procedural challenge brought by a plaintiff who is injured by a
failure to comply with NEPA “may complain o f that failure at the time the failure takes
place, for the claim can never get riper.”'"®
In a final attempt to avoid dismissal for lack o f ripeness, the plaintiffs argued that
the opening of trails to motorized travel and coinciding failure to promote backcountry

Id. at 736-37(m tem al quotations omitted) (quoting A bbott Lab., 387 U .S. at 148, Lujan, 497 U .S. at 891,
and Duke Pow er Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U .S. 59, 82 (1978)).
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
42 U .S.C . § 4 3 2 1 (1994).
956 F.2d at 1514.
O hio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 737. In Lujan v. Defenders o f W ildlife, the Court illustrates this point in
terms o f standing, stating “[tjhus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction o f a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to prepare
an environm ental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement
w ill cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam w ill not be com pleted for many
years.” 504 U .S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992).
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recreation in areas designated for logging are harms that will occur now.

However, the

complaint did not include these claims, so the Court declined to address them.‘^° But the
Court did state that the Government's brief and the Solicitor General, at oral argument,
conceded that concerns o f immediate harm resulting from the plan would be justiciable.'^'
The Court explicitly recognized that if the plaintiffs “had previously raised these kinds of
harm, the ripeness analysis in this case with respect to those provisions of the Plan that
produce the harm would be significantly different.”'^^ Also, the Court’s statement that
the plaintiffs could not point to “any other way in which the Plan could now force it to
modify its behavior in order to avoid future adverse consequences,”'®^ implicitly
recognizes that when a plaintiff can show a forest plan forces such a modification, the
plan, or a part of it, is ripe for review. Lujan supports this view, finding elements o f a
plan that require claimants to immediately adjust their behavior are ripe. The Court, in
Ohio Forestry, added “[a]ny such later challenge might also include a challenge to the
lawfulness of the present Plan if (but only if) the present Plan then matters, i.e., if the
Plan plays a causal role with respect to the future, then imminent, harm from logging.”'®"
Despite the Court’s closing out review of substantive provisions of LRMP’s on
the facts presented, Ohio Forestry expressed dicta that leaves open two avenues to
challenge LRMPs: 1) claims of procedural harm, and 2) claims of substantive defects in a
plan where injuries are not contingent on some activity requiring a second stage of
decision making after the plan’s adoption. The Court’s reasoning and the foregoing
analysis suggest site-specific allegations o f imminent harm are necessary to claimants
O hio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 738.
Id. at 739.
' " M at 738
M at 734
154
Id.
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taking the second avenue, but not the first. Subsequent LRMP cases interpreting Ohio
Forestry demonstrate apparent confusion over the characterization o f claims as
procedural or substantive, and when to require site-specific allegations of imminent harm.
D.

Judicial Interpretation of Ohio Forestry

In recent cases involving LRMP challenges, several federal courts found claims of
procedural harm, and substantive claims o f imminent site-specific harm justiciable in
light o f Ohio Forestry. Others have declined to do so, relying in part on Ohio Forestry to
deny the ripeness o f challenges to the Forest Service’s failure to follow the monitoring
requirements of its own regulations and LRMPs. Such challenges should be
characterized as procedural claims and allowed without requiring site-specific allegations.
1.

Federal District Court Decisions

In Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. Worthington, environmental groups sought to
prevent certain logging activities in eastern Kentucky’s Daniel Boone Forest until the
Forest Service complied with applicable law, administrative regulations, and the
provisions of the Forest Plan.'^^ The plaintiffs asserted four separate claims. First, they
alleged the agency violated the ESA’s requirement of consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service'^* in adopting the Plan, nine amendments to the Plan and three
management policies which authorized projects that may affect listed species.'^’ Second,
the plaintiffs claimed the Forest Service’s failure to consider alternatives to clearcutting
violated NEPA requirement that the agency study, develop, and describe appropriate
alternatives in the EIS that accompanies the Forest Plan.’^* Third, the plaintiffs argued

20 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1090 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
16 U .S.C . § 1536 (supp. 1999), 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.11 and 402.14 (1999).
K entucky H eartwooci, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. The Daniel B oone Forest is hom e to at least thirty-three
threatened or endangered species o f plants and animals. Id. at 1081-82.
Id.
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the agency violated NFM A’s requirement that amendments and policies supplemental to
the Forest Plan go through the NEPA process before they can legally guide management
activities in the f or es t . Fi n al l y, they challenged the Forest Plan’s adoption of
clearcutting as the exclusive timber harvest method, claiming it violated NFMA, which
does not allow exclusive use o f clearcutting.'^
After a lengthy discussion o f the facts and holding in Ohio Forestry, District
Court Judge Forester characterized the plaintiffs’ first three claims as procedural and held
their ESA and NEPA challenges to the forest plan were ripe, and their NFMA claim was
also ripe “as it relates to defendant’s failure to comply with a particular procedure.”*®'
However, Judge Forester dismissed the NFMA challenge to the forest plan’s
authorization of clearcutting as the exclusive harvest method, stating that challenges to
the content o f forest plans brought pursuant to NFMA are not justiciable in light o f Ohio
Forestry
Kentucky Heartwood applies the Ohio Forestry decision’s acceptance of
procedural challenges to LRMPs. It also demonstrates that not all claims brought under
NFMA need necessarily be characterized as substantive. Though the Court in Ohio
Forestry makes a rough distinction between NEPA claims as procedural and NFMA
claims as substantive, this court finds that NFMA and ESA claims may also be
procedural in nature.

'“ M at 1088.
Jd. at 1090.
Id. (noting that Ohio F orestry distinguishes NEPA from N FM A on the grounds that former requires a
particular procedure, w hile the latter requires a particular result. 523 U .S. at 737).
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2.

Federal Circuit Court Decisions
a.

D C. Circuit

In Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Service, a collection of
environmental groups challenged a Forest Service decision authorizing oil and gas
leasing o f land in the Shoshone National Forest in northwestern W y o m i n g . T h e
plaintiffs argued the Agency violated its own regulations governing the leases and
violated NEPA by authorizing the leases without first determining whether an adequate
site specific environmental review had been performed.’^'*
The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 governs the
issuance o f oil and gas leases in national f o r e s t s . I n 1990, the Forest Service
promulgated regulations implementing its responsibilities under the Act.'^* The
regulations require Forest Service authorization of leases shall be subject to three sitespecific factual findings made by the A g e n c y . F i r s t , the Forest Service must verify that
leasing o f the specific lands has been adequately addressed in a NEPA document and is
consistent with the forest’s LRMP.'** If the Agency determines that NEPA has not been
satisfied or further environmental assessment is necessary, additional analysis must be
done before a leasing decision is made for specific l a n d s . S e c o n d , the Agency must
ensure that conditions o f surface use are stipulated in any resulting lease.'™ Third, the
Forest Service must determine that the proposed surface use is allowable somewhere on

165 F .3 d 4 3 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
at 45.
'“ /</. (citing 30 U .S.C . § 2 26(g)-(h ) (Supp. 1999)).
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 2 28.102(c) and (e) (1999)).
Id.
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.1 0 2 (e)(1 ) (1999)).
Id.
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(c)(1) and (e)(2) (1999)).
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the land subject to leasing.'^'
In the EIS and the ROD for the proposed leases, the Forest Service found NEPA
compliance was adequate, but expressly stated that it was not making any of the required
f i n d i n g s . T h e plaintiffs challenged the Agency’s failure to include the required
findings in the EIS and ROD, claiming this violated the Agency’s regulations and
NEPA.^’^ The District Court held for the defendants, deferring to the Agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations and finding that the Service’s EIS was sufficiently
site-specific that it did not violate NEPA.'^‘‘ This appeal followed. In the meantime, the
Agency completed the NEPA process, made the required findings, and authorized the
BLM to lease three parcels in the Shoshone National Forest.
After a discussion of the Constitution’s Article III jurisdictional requirements, the
Court o f Appeals for the District of Columbia focused on the prudential concern of
ripeness, and applied the Ohio Forestry three-part test.'’^ With the benefit of hindsight,
the court held the “point o f irreversible and irretrievable commitment o f resources and the
concomitant obligation to fully comply with NEPA [did] not mature until the leases
[were] issued,” and thus the claim was unripe at the time the plaintiffs filed their
a p p e a l . T h e court went on to say the plaintiffs could challenge the Service’s NEPA
compliance after the BLM issued the leases.
In contrast, the court characterized as procedural the plaintiffs’ claim that the
Agency violated its own regulations by issuing the EIS and ROD without completing the

M
Id.
173
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
""M

(citing 36 C.F.R. § 2 2 8 .102(e)(3) (1999)).
at 47.

at 48-49.
at 49.
at 50.
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required f i n d i n g s . T h e court stated that where an agency promulgates regulations that
erect a procedural barrier and then ignores them, the plaintiff need only show that the
government act performed without the procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a
particularized interest o f the plaintiff.'*” Then, quoting Ohio Forestry, the court went on
to say a person injured by an agency’s failure to comply with a procedural requirement
may complain of the failure when it occurs, because the claim can never get riper.'*'
Wyoming Outdoor Council treats ripeness as prudential requirement and shows
that all NEPA-based challenges to LRMPs are not necessarily ripe in light o f Ohio
Forestry. However, this decision does recognize the procedural nature and ripeness o f an
agency decision to ignore its own implementing regulations. By finding an agency
decision to ignore the procedural requirements o f its own regulations ripe for review, the
D.C. Circuit implies that such a decision is a final agency action or failure to act under
the APA.
b.

Ninth Circuit

Wilderness Society v. Thomas required the Ninth Circuit to decide whether the
Forest Service violated NFMA in preparing a LRMP for the Prescott National Forest in
central Arizona.'*^ The final Prescott National Forest Plan identified a total amount of
land not physically “capable” o f sustaining commercial grazing.'** A coalition of
environmental groups filed suit, claiming in count one that the Plan violates NFMA and
Forest Service regulations which also require a separate analysis to determine if lands
physically “capable” of sustaining grazing are also “suitable” for grazing, taking into

at 51.
Id. (quoting Florida A udubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
Id. (quoting Ohio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 737).
188 F.3d 1 1 3 0 (9 “’ Cir. 1999).
M at 1132.
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account economic and environmental considerations, as well as alternative uses for the
land.'®" The plaintiffs also made site-specific challenges, alleging in counts two and three
that the Agency violated NFMA when it issued grazing permits for two grazing
allotments pursuant to the Plan. The District Court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and this appeal followed.'*®
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by applying the Ohio Forestry three-part
test to determine the ripeness of the plaintiffs’ claims.'** The court then acknowledged
that Ohio Forestry allows challenges to a forest plan when plaintiffs allege either
imminent, concrete injuries that would be caused by the plan, or a site-specific injury
causally related to an alleged defect in the plan.'*^ The court characterized count one as
“a generic challenge [to a forest plan] that Ohio Forestry cautions against adjudicating”
and held it unripe for review despite the court’s explicit acknowledgment of the defective
forest plan’s causal relationship to the site-specific injuries alleged in counts two and
three.'** The court then found counts two and three ripe for review and stated that
“ [bjecause the site-specific injury to the two [grazing] allotments is alleged to have been
caused by a defect in the Forest Plan, we may consider whether the Forest Service
complied with NFMA in making its general its general grazing suitability determinations
in the Forest Plan.”'*^
In Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized the justiciability of
Forest Service noncompliance with a forest plan, when the failure to comply causes sitespecific harm. Wilderness Society suggests that noncompliance with the mandates of a
'" M
M
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1132-33.
at 1133.
(citing Ohio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 733).
at 1133-34 (citing O hio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 738-39).
1134.
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forest plan is a final agency action or a justiciable failure to act for purposes of the APA.
Wilderness Society also unnecessarily extends the Ohio Forestry requirement o f sitespecific harm to what is more properly characterized as a procedural claim.
Friends O f The Kalmiopsis v. United States Forest Service is a memorandum
decision issued by the Ninth Circuit involving a challenge by environmental groups to the
Forest Service’s handling o f off-road vehicle (ORV) impacts in the Siskiyou National
Forest in southwest Oregon and northwest California.'^ The plaintiffs claimed first that
the Forest Service violated NFMA by failing to amend or revise the Forest LRMP to
address new information pertaining to the spread of disease fatal to Port Orford cedar
trees. Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the Service violated an executive order and the
Agency’s own implementing regulations by its failure to adequately monitor ORV
impacts and prepare annual reviews of the Forest’s ORV management plan. Finally, the
environmental groups claimed that the Agency’s violation o f its own wet-season road
closure was arbitrary and capricious.'^'
The court found the Agency’s “lax monitoring unlikely to expose potential
problems caused by ORVs” '^^ However, the court found the claim unripe for review
under the APA because there was no complete failure to perform a legally required duty
that is necessary to constitute a final agency action or failure to act.'^^ The agency and
the court concede that in light of Ohio Forestry, these claims would be ripe for review if
the harm was made more imminent by a Forest Service attempt to revise its Forest Plan
or designate ORV areas without adequate monitoring.'^" In this case however, the court

198 F.3d 253 (9“' Cir. 1999).
Id.

Id. (citing Ohio F orestry, 523 U .S. 726).
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found no imminent agency action that hinged on the result o f the allegedly deficient
monitoring results and annual plan review
In Friends O f The Kalmiopsis^ the Ninth Circuit addressed ripeness o f claims
brought under the APA which allege Forest Service failure to adequately fulfill
monitoring requirements. Here, the court relied on Ohio Forestry and expressly stated
that such claims would be ripe if the Forest Service made the harm more imminent by
taking site-specific action based on inadequate monitoring. This suggests that the court is
actually focusing on Ohio Forestry's imminence requirement and not the finality of an
agency decision to disregard mandatory regulations. However, Ohio Forestry involved a
challenge to substantive provisions o f an LRMP, which is easily distinguished from cases
challenging agency interpretation and implementation o f LRMP provisions. While a
generic (non-site-specific) challenge to the content o f an LRMP may indeed benefit from
the focus provided by imminent site-specific harm, challenges to agency interpretation
and implementation o f forest plans and regulations are more akin to the procedural claims
that Ohio Forestry recognizes as ripe when they occur.
E.

Ripeness in Species Monitoring Cases
1.

ONRC V . United States Forest Service

Plaintiffs in Oregon Natural Resources Council Action v. United States Forest
Service and Bureau o f Land Management (ONRC) claimed the federal agencies violated
the monitoring and surveying requirements o f their own LRMP.'^^ The LRMP in this
case was the Northwest Forest Plan, adopted in 1994 in response to concerns over the
management o f federal forests within the geographic range o f the northern spotted owl.''^’

Id
59 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W .D . Wash. 1999) (hereinafter ONRC).
at 1087.
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The plan seeks to ensure the viability of certain rare species by requiring surveys for
those species before any ground-disturbing activities that are implemented after a specific
cut-off date.'^* The agencies issued memoranda exempting timber sales from survey
requirements when the sales’ EISs were completed before the applicable cut-off date, or
when the sales were to take place in an area of abundant red tree vole habitat or isolated
watersheds under private ownership.
The plaintiffs claimed the agencies’ authorization of certain timber sales without
first conducting surveys for certain species of wildlife, as required by the LRMP,^^
violated NFMA and FLPMA and their implementing regulations which require timber
sales be consistent with guiding LRMPs.^'” The plaintiffs also alleged a NEPA violation
because significant new information had come to light which the agencies failed to
address by preparing a supplemental EIS^“ as required by NEPA and its implementing
regulations.^^
District Court Judge Dwyer characterized the plaintiffs’ claims as procedural
because they sought to enforce a procedural requirement that, if disregarded, could impair
their concrete interests.^*’'* The agencies and intervening timber companies argued these
claims were not final agency actions and not ripe for review under Ohio Forestry
Judge Dwyer found the NEPA claims ripe for review under section 706(1) of the APA,

Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id.
See NFM A, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (Supp. 1999), and 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e) (1999); FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §
1732(a) (Supp. 1999), and 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3 (1999).
“ ^ 5 9 F . Supp. 2d at 1088.
NEPA at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (Supp. 1999), 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1999).
204 gg p Supp. 2d at 1089. Logging without the required surveys and thus without knowledge o f the
number and location o f critical species (like the northern spotted ow l and the red tree vole that the owl
feeds on) may cause permanent harm to the species, and thus to the plaintiffs’ interests. Id.
Id. at 1090

35
R e p ro d u c e d with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

which he characterized as “an exception to the final agency action requirement.”^®®
ONRC stated that the agencies’ decision to authorize the timber sales without surveys
constituted final agency actions under section 704 of the APA.^®^ Judge Dwyer also
found the plaintiffs’ challenge to specific timber sales rendered the claim ripe in light of
Ohio Forestry
Like Kentucky Heartwood, ONRC also stands for the proposition that procedural
claims, including those based on FLPMA and NFMA as well as NEPA, should be
considered ripe under Ohio Forestry. In addition, it finds that an agency decision to
disregard the requirements of a LRMP is reviewable as a final agency action or failure to
act for the purposes of the APA. Finally, Judge Dwyer’s opinion also demonstrates the
perceived need for site-specific allegations in order to square this type of challenge with
the mandates of Ohio Forestry, even when the claim is procedural in nature.
2.

Sierra Club v. Martin

In Sierra Club v. Martin, environmental groups challenged the Forest Service’s
approval of seven timber sales in the Chattahoochee and Oconee National Forests in the
Appalachian Mountains of northern Georgia.^®® The proposed timber sales would cover
roughly 2000 acres, require the construction of eighteen miles of roads and release over
155 tons o f sediment into nearby streams.^'® The LRMP under which the timber sales
were approved was adopted in 1985 and amended in 1989.^” Prior to any timber sale, the
plan required the Forest Service to conduct a site-specific study to determine whether the

Id. (quoting ONRC v. BLM, 150 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9* Cir. 1998)).
Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U .S. 154, 178 (1997)).
Id. (citing M artin, 168 F. 3d at 6 (11*^ Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiff was “entitled to challenge the Forest
Service’s compliance with the [forest] Plan as part o f its site-specific challenge to the timber sales”)).
168 F.3d 1 (11"' Cir. 1999) rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied by Sierra Club v.
Martin, 181 F.3d 111 ( i f Cir. 1999).
Id. at 2.

"'/4.
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sale would harm the area or resident species.^'^ After studying the area of the proposed
sales, the Agency determined there would be no adverse impact and approved the sales/'^

The plaintiffs first alleged that the decision to approve the sales was arbitrary and
capricious under the APA because the Service did not obtain or consider population data
for sensitive species and species proposed or listed under the ESA, as required by the
forest plan.^‘" Second, the plaintiffs claimed the failure to acquire population data
violated NFMA’s 219 regulations as w ell/'^ The plaintiffs also challenged the forest
plan itself, arguing that by allowing such timber harvests, it violated NFMA’s
requirement that the plan adequately protect the soil, watershed, fish and wildlife o f the
Forest/'^ The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that
the Forest Service was not required to obtain population data before approving timber
sales/'^
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit began with the first claim and
refused to defer to the Forest Service’s conclusion that there will be no significant impact
to the sensitive species. The court found agency actions must be reversed as arbitrary and
capricious when the agency fails to “examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.’”^‘* The court held the Service’s failure to gather the

Id. at 2-3.
M at 3.
Id. The Sierra Club claim ed the decision to proceed with the timber sales violated 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.19
and 2 1 9 .2 6 because the agency had not collected population data for MISs. Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5 (quoting Motor V ehicle Mfrs. A ss’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
H ow ever, nothing in the record indicated that the Forest Service possessed baseline population data from
w hich to measure the impacts on these species. Id.
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population data was contrary to the forest plan and therefore the decision to authorize the
sales without the data was arbitrary and capricious/'^
In response to the second claim, the Forest Service argued that NFMA’s 219
regulations could not be challenged at the site-specific level, because they apply only to
the forest planning process/^" Further, the Agency argued that the plan itself was not a
final agency action and could not be challenged/^' The court agreed that the regulations
apply only to the planning process but noted that the planning process did not end with
the plan’s approval, because NFMA’s implementing regulations require plan revision
under various circumstances/^^ The 219 regulations, opined the court, taken together
“require the Forest Service to gather quantitative data on MIS and use it to measure the
impact o f habitat changes on the Forest’s diversity/^^ This, the court recognized, differs
with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Inland Empire, that habitat viability analysis would
satisfy the 219 regulations/^"
Without citing Ohio Forestry, the court also held the environmental groups could
challenge the Forest Service’s compliance with its own LRMP as a part of their sitespecific challenge to the timber sales/^^ The court recognized that a contrary result
would make it impossible for a plaintiff to ever seek review o f the Forest Service’s
compliance with a Forest Plan/^^ Instead o f Ohio Forestry, the court relied on its own

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
223
Id. at 7. The court noted that to read the 219 regulations otherwise w ould render one or another
m eaningless “as w ell to disregard the regulations’ directive that population trends o f the MIS be monitored
and that inventory data be gathered in order to monitor the effects o f the forest plan.” Id. citing Sierra Club
V. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
Id. at 7, n. 10. The court did not believe the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion conform ed with the plain
language o f 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(2), which requires evaluation o f “both amount and quality o f habitat and
o f animal population trends o f the management indicator species.” Id.
Id.
Id.
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decision in Wilderness Society v. Alcock for the proposition that a court can hear a
challenge to a Forest Plan once a site-specific action is proposed/^^ The decision did not
address the Plaintiffs’ challenge to the plan itself.
Martin does not cite Ohio Forestry, but it does treat a Forest Service decision to
ignore its own LRMP’s monitoring requirements, which derive from regulations
implementing NFMA, as final for APA purposes. It is important to note that in Martin,
the Eleventh Circuit did not uphold or declare ripe a challenge to the content of a LRMP.
The court merely held that a claimant could seek review of the Forest Service’s
compliance with a forest plan it had already adopted. While this court also requires a
site-specific complaint, it does so in reliance on a case other than Ohio Forestry.
3.

Sierra Club v. Peterson

Sierra Club v. Peterson {Peterson

involved a fourteen-year dispute between

environmental groups and the Forest Service over the management of four National
Forests in eastern Texas.^^® In 1985, the environmental groups first challenged the Forest
Service’s management o f these National Forests in response to the Agency’s cutting of
timber in wilderness areas to control the spread of the Southern Pine Beetle.^^® In 1987,
the groups’ efforts diverged into two distinct tracks of litigation.^^' The first involved
claims that clearcutting violated NFMA and its associated regulations.” ^ The second
involved attempts by the groups to protect the habitat of the Red-Cockaded

Id. (citing Wilderness S o c ’y, 83 F.3d at 390).
^ 185 F,3d 349 (5* Cir. 1999) (heareinafter P eterson I) reh’g en banc granted 204 F.3d 580 (5“' Cir. 2000)
rev’d after rehearing en banc 228 F.3d 559 (5"' Cir. 2001).
Id. at 353. These forests are the Sam Houston, D avy Crockett, Angelina, and the Sabine, which cover
639,000 acres in Texas,
at 355.
Id. at 356.
Id.
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Woodpecker.^” This case is the second-to-last stop on the first track.” '*
The environmental groups claimed that the Forest Service’s authorization o f evenaged management teehniques (clearcutting) for several timber sales violated NFMA’s
mandate that the Agency protect the diversity of plant and animal communities and
protect resources in the National Forests.” ^ The Plaintiffs also argued the Service’s
practices violated NFMA, the Agency’s implementing regulations, and the forests’
LRMP requirements o f inventorying and monitoring for diversity and resource
protection.^” The district court found it had jurisdiction to review the Forest Service’s
failure to authorize timber sales in eompliance with NFMA and its regulations and
concluded this failure was a final agency action for the purposes of the APA.^^^ The
Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits,” ^ the district court enjoined future timber harvest until
the Forest Service complied with NFMA, and the Agency and intervening timber
interests appealed.^^^
After upholding the district court’s finding that the environmental groups had
standing, the majority opinion in Peterson / commenced a lengthy discussion o f ripeness
and final agency action, in which it distinguished the case fi"om Lujan and Ohio

Id.
Id
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358 (citing Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905, 914 (E.D. Tex. 1997)).
Specifically, the court determined that the Forest Service was violating its duties to protect; soil
resources, see 16 U .S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(E)(i), (g)(3)(F)(v); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.27(a)(1), (b)(5), (c)(6), (f);
and watershed resources, see 16 U .S.C . §§ 1604(g)(3)(E )(i), (g)(3)(E )(iii), (g)(3)(F)(v); 36 C.F.R. §§
219.27(a)(1), (a)(4), (b)(5), (c)(6), (e), (f). See Sierra Club. 974 F.Supp. at 942. Additionally, the court
found that the Forest Service was not inventorying and monitoring the follow ing properly: w ildlife, see 16
U .S.C . §§ 1604(g)(2)(B ), (g)(3)(C); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.11(d), 219.12(d), (k), 219.19(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5),
(a)(6); diversity, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.26; and its success in m eeting its objectives and adhering to its
standards, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.12(k). 5ee Sierra Club, 974 F.Supp. at 942.
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Forestry}*^ Though the majority extolled the importance o f the site-specific aspect o f the
challenge to satisfy Ohio Forestry and the ripeness doctrine, at one point its opinion
characterized the Service’s decision not to follow the forest plan’s monitoring
requirements (rather than the authorization of the timber sales) as the final agency action
that rendered the claim justiciable.^'*' The majority recognized the Forest Service’s
decision not to follow the inventory and monitoring requirements of the LRMP as an
“adjudication” representing a “failure to act” which satisfies the “final agency action”
requirement of the APA, as interpreted by Ohio Forestry
In Peterson /, a case virtually identical to Martin, the Fifth Circuit addressed the
justiciability o f a challenge to the Forest Service’s authorization of timber sales without
fulfilling its monitoring requirements.^"^ In fact, the Fifth Circuit expressly agreed with
the holding and reasoning of its “sister circuit” in Martin}'^ While the Eleventh Circuit,
in Martin, declined the opportunity to reconcile its holding with Ohio Forestry, the Fifth
Circuit had no choice. In response to a vigorous dissent on the ripeness issue, the
Peterson / majority was forced to distinguish the instant case from Lujan and Ohio
Forestry}'*^
First, the majority noted that in Lujan, “the plaintiffs challenged everything about
the BLM's policies from soup to nuts, not a site-specific individual policy.”^"^ In
Peterson I, the plaintiffs “pointed to specific activities on specific plots . .. and
challenged the mechanism by which the Forest Service determined how to approve those

Id. at 361-73. The majority opinion indicates it might have avoided much this discussion had it not been
for a vigorous dissent on the issue. Id.
Id. at 365-72.
Id.
1 8 5 F .3 d 349 (S'" Cir. 1999).
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 362-64.
Id. at 363.
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discrete logging practices.”^'*’ The majority cited with approval Justice Scalia’s
observation in Lujan that a case would be ripe where a specific final agency action has an
actual or inunediately threatened effect which may require even a whole program to be
revised by the agency to avoid an unlawful result.^'**
Ohio Forestry, according to the majority, is both easily distinguished and
supportive of finding this dispute ripe for review.^"*’ In Peterson I, the plaintiffs alleged
the Forest Service violated its regulations and NFMA when it approved even-aged
management on site-specific timber sales without fulfilling the LRMP’s requirement that
management indicator species be inventoried or monitored in order to assess the impact
o f various harvesting t e c h n i q u e s . Wh e r e a s in Ohio Forestry, no logging was yet
authorized pursuant to the LRMP, and the Forest Service had not even reached the point
o f implementing its LRMP or NFMA “on-the-ground” when the suit was brought.^^’
Ohio Forestry supports, the majority opined, the proposition that “disagreements over
final, specific action are necessarily ripe.”^^^
Though the majority extolled the importance of the site-specific aspect of the
challenge to satisfy Ohio Forestry and the ripeness doctrine, it characterized the Service’s
decision not to follow the Forest Plan’s monitoring requirements (rather than the approval
of the timber sales) as the final agency action that rendered the claim justiciable/^^ The
majority recognized this decision as an “adjudication” representing a “failure to act”
which satisfies the “final agency action” requirement of the APA, as interpreted by Ohio

Id.
Id. (citing Lujan, 497 U .S. at 894).
" ' M at 363 n. 16.

Id.
Id. at 365-72.
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F o r e s t r y The majority summarized its reasoning for this characterization and the
propriety o f the plaintiffs’ challenge as follows:
“The Forest Service determined that it would conduct timber sales from
trees growing in Texas’s National Forests; it considered two alternative
means of harvesting the trees - even-aged and uneven-aged timber
management; it was aware of the regulations that required it to inventory
and to monitor species that would be affected by even-aged timber
management practices; it affirmatively decided not to follow those
regulations; it engaged in even-aged management; it conducted timber
sales subsequent to those practices. When the Forest Service elected not to
follow those regulations, it undertook a final agency action fo r the
purposes o f the inventorying and monitoring that the regulations
prescribed. Failure to follow those regulations is what the Appellees
challenged.”^^^
Peterson I explicitly allows a single challenge to multiple timber sales without
any discussion o f the different site-specific effects at the various and individual sales,
further demonstrating that what is important is not the “on-the-ground” effects of the
Service’s decision not to monitor, but the decision i t s e l f . I n light of this
characterization and the fact that the plaintiffs challenged the Service’s failure to follow
the mandates of its forest plan rather than the plan itself, reliance on Ohio Forestry and
the perceived need to distinguish or justify this decision seems unnecessary.
Peterson / / ” stemmed from the Fifth Circuit’s decision to rehear the case en
banc,^^* and resulted in a split decision with seven judges joining the majority opinion
overturning Peterson /, and five judges dissenting.^^^ Relying mainly on Lujan v.

Id.
Id. at 370-71 (em phasis supplied).
185 F.3d at 370-72.
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d 559 (5* Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Peterson II).
204 F.3d 580 (5*^ Cir. 2000).
Judges Jolly, Higginbotham, Davis, Jones, Smith, Barksdale, and D eM oss concurred in the majority
opinion. Judge Higginbotham filed a separate concurrence. Judges Politz, Wiener, Benavides, and Deimis
concurred in Judge Stewart’s dissent. C hief Judge King did not participate, and Judge Parker was recused
and did not participate.
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National Wildlife Federations^ the majority held that the plaintiffs had not challenged
specific final agency actions, but characterized the suit as a wholesale challenge to Forest
Service practices in Texas, and stated this was “precisely the type of programmatic
challenge the Supreme Court Struck down in LujanF^*’^
The majority did recognize that plaintiffs also made site-specific challenges, but
stated that alleging specific improper final agency actions within a program does not
allow a plaintiff to challenge an entire program.^*^ The court somehow viewed as
inapplicable in this case LujaWs statement that environmental groups can challenge “a
specific ‘final agency action’ [which] has an actual or immediately threatened effect,”
even when such a challenge has “the effect of requiring a regulation, a series of
regulations, or even a whole ‘program’ to be revised by the agency.”^^^
The majority also noted that the plaintiffs could not challenge the Agency’s
failure to inventory or monitor because this was not a ‘final agency action’ fi-om which
legal consequences f l o w e d . F u r t h e r , the court held that this was not a justiciable
‘failure to act,’ stating that “alleged failure to comply with the NFMA in maintaining
Texas’s national forests does not reflect agency inaction,” as opposed to where the Forest
Service has “failed to issue an LRMP or to conduct timber sales.”^®^ The majority did not
explain how failure to issue an LRMP, as required by NFMA, differs from a failure to
inventory or monitor, as required by NFMA.
In a concurring opinion. Judge Higginbotham attempted to provide guidance to

-««497 U .S. 871 (1990).
228 F.3d at 566.
Id. at 567.
Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U .S. at 894).
Id. at note 11 (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U .S. at 733-34).
Id. at 568.
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the trial court on remand/^^ “Regarding allegations and proof,” the Judge noted,
“plaintiffs must allege and prove a specific timber sale will violate the law.”^®’ Regarding
the remedy in such a case, he stated “a court may not enjoin an entire program . . . [b]ut a
component of enjoining a discrete, challenged action is enjoining the conduct that makes
the challenged actions illegal” which may prevent “future sales that share the
illegality.”^^*
The dissent made three important points. First, it pointed out that the plaintiffs
had “continuously identified specific agency actions which they allege violate the
NFMA.^^^ Second, the dissent noted that the purpose of requiring a final agency action is
to reduce the scope of the controversy to manageable proportions and flesh out factual
components by looking at a concrete action that applies the regulation in a manner that
harms the plaintiff.” ^ Finally, the dissent recognized that the case at bar was much more
factually similar to SierraClub v. Martin^^^ which the majority cited with approval, than
to Lujan
The strained reasoning of the Peterson //m ajority is at least partially a problem
with requiring substantive allegations of site-specific harm where procedural illegalities
are alleged. It primarily stems from the total lack of logic in limiting the number and
scope o f substantive allegations of site-specific harm under the doctrine of ripeness. The
opinion ignores Ohio Forestry s explicit recognition that harm caused by a defect in the

Id. at 570.
Id. Further noting that “the trial court must find by a preponderance o f the evidence, that the Forest
Service w ill violate the law in executing or implementing the specific challenged timber sale.” Id. at 571.
’“ /d. at 571.
Id. at 573 Illustrating this fact, the dissent notes that the district court was able to conduct a seven-day
bench trial consisting largely o f evidence focused on specific sales and parcels o f land. Id.
"™Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U .S. at 890, and noting that this is exactly what the plaintiffs in this case did).
168 F.3d 1 (ll'^ C ir. 1999).
Id.
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plan, will allow review o f that portion of the plan.
Though Peterson //n e v e r reaches questions of agency discretion or the merits
because it is decided on the jurisdictional issue of ripeness, even a cursory reading o f the
opinion suggests the presence of two guilty parties. The Forest Service is guilty of
ignoring the mandates of NFMA throughout Texas’s forests, and the judges responsible
for the majority opinion are guilty of rendering an ill-considered and illogical opinion.
4.

Ecology Center, Inc. v. United States Forest Service

Ecology Center, Inc. v. United States Forest Service involved a challenge to a
Forest Service decision not to follow the monitoring requirements of its LRMP for the
Kootenai National Forest in Northwest Montana.^’^ This challenge was similar to
Peterson, but the plaintiff complained of no site-specific timber sales made under the
Plan.™ In a brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Ecology
Center’s action, holding that the challenge was not ripe for adjudication since the Forest
Service’s failure to perform certain monitoring tasks was not a final agency action or a
justiciable failure to act under the APA as interpreted by Ohio Forestry
The Plaintiff challenged, under the APA, the Forest Service’s failure to comply
with monitoring duties imposed by NFMA, its implementing regulations, and the
Kootenai National Forest Plan.^^® The plan was adopted in 1987 and requires the Agency
to produce annual, biannual and five-year reports containing monitoring data for
recreation trends, wildlife habitat and populations, species listed under the ESA, and the
like.^’’ In 1996, the Ecology Center filed suit alleging the Agency failed to publish the

192 F.3d 922 (9* Cir. 1999).

"'A /
Id. at 926.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 924.
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required reports in 1988 and 1993, and the required monitoring was insufficient in the
reports it did file.^’* The Forest Service acknowledged its failure to publish reports for
those two years and admitted that the reports it did publish contained inadequate data for
some parameters.^^^ However, the magistrate judge for the district court never reached
the merits of the dispute but dismissed the action for lack of ripeness.^®”
For the Ninth Circuit, resolution of the jurisdiction issue hinged on whether the
Agency’s failure to adequately monitor was either a final agency action or an action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed under the APA/®' The court classified
monitoring and reporting as advisory steps leading to an agency decision/®^ The court
recognized that the duty to monitor was mandatory, but relying on Ohio Forestry, found
that legal consequences did not flow, nor did rights or obligations arise fi'om that duty/®^
Ohio Forestry, the court suggested, requires plaintiffs to withhold their challenge until “a
time when harm is more imminent and more certain.”^®"
While the Plaintiffs complaint did not allege imminent harm from a site-specific
activity, the Ecology Center argued that it suffered actionable injury because the
inadequate monitoring deprived it of information necessary to effective oversight of
Agency activities provided for by NFMA/®^ The court countered that NFMA does not
provide for public oversight of monitoring, only o f the formation, amendment and
revision ofLRMPs/®^ The Plaintiffs argued denial of this claim would essentially

"'AT
Id.
Id. at 924-26.
Id. at 925.
-*■' Id. (quoting Ohio F orestry, 523 U .S. at 734).
Id. at 925.
Id. at 926 n. 7.
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prevent judicial review of inadequate monitoring by the A g e n c y T h e court stated that
such claims would be justiciable when linked to an APA challenge to a final agency
action like a timber sale.^^*
The court then addressed the Ecology Center’s claim that the failure to monitor
was ripe for review under section 706(1) of the APA as an agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.^*^ This provision of the APA, the court maintained,
applies only when there is a genuine failure to act, and not when the Forest Service
“merely failed to conduct its duty in strict conformance with the plan and NFMA
regulations.”^^®
Ecology Center is a challenge similar to the Martin and Peterson cases, except the
plaintiff complained of no site-specific timber sales made under the plan.^®‘ Ecology
Center demonstrates unnecessary application of Ohio Forestry in a case similar to Martin
and Peterson, where the challenge was not to a LRMP, but to the Forest Service’s failure
to follow the Plan’s requirements. The decision also illustrates the perceived necessity
for allegations of site-specific injury, like a timber sale, upon which the court can base a
finding of imminent harm. This requirement seems misplaced when the plaintiff s claim
in this case could easily be characterized as a claim o f procedural harm, which even Ohio
Forestry recognizes to be ripe upon occurrence, and not dependent on further allegations
o f site-specific harm. The Agency’s failure to follow its own procedures, which are
mandated by the Forest Plan, will prevent effective amendment and revision of the Plan,

Id. at 926 n. 6.
Id. at 926 (citing Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F 3d 1146, 1153 (9* Cir. 1998) (allowing a
challenge to a timber sale on grounds that the Forest Service violated its forest plan when it failed to
monitor trout populations in a stream affected by the sale)).
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id.
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as well as informed resource allocation decisions like timber sales.
Ecology Center ignores the reasoning o f the D.C. Circuit, in Wyoming Outdoor
Council, that where an agency promulgates regulations that erect a procedural barrier and
then ignores them, the plaintiff need only show that the government act performed
without the procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a particularized interest of
the p l a i n t i f f . Ecology Center also runs counter to Wyoming Outdoor Center's
recognition of the procedural nature and ripeness o f an agency decision to ignore its own
implementing regulations. By finding an agency decision to ignore the procedural
requirements o f its own regulations ripe for review, the D.C. Circuit implied that such a
decision is a final agency action or failure to act under the APA.
Ecology Center also conflicts with other cases in the Ninth Circuit, The opinion
in Wilderness Society, contrary to the holding in Ecology Center, suggests that
noncompliance with the mandates of a forest plan is a final agency action or a justiciable
failure to act for purposes of the APA. Finally, in Friends O f The Kalmiopsis, the Ninth
Circuit relied on Ohio Forestry and expressly stated that such claims would be ripe if the
Forest Service made the harm more imminent by taking site-specific action based on
inadequate monitoring. While the Ecology Center failed to challenge a site-specific
activity, the Forest Service made timber sales throughout the forest, in the absence of
monitoring data.
F.

Conclusion

The Ohio Forestry decision is a serious blow to environmental plaintiffs, and it is
tempting to read its holding as closing the courthouse door to all challenges to LRMPs.
However, more careful inspection of the dicta reveals that the Court left two doors open.

Id. (quoting Florida Audubon S oc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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and study o f the subsequent case law shows that plaintiffs in lower court decisions after
Ohio Forestry have taken advantage of these doors.
First, Ohio Forestry reaffirmed, from Lujan, the justiciability of challenges to
LRMPs based on claims of procedural harm. Though Ohio Forestry explicitly recognizes
only procedural claims brought under NEPA, subsequent cases show that such claims are
also viable under NFMA, FLPMA, and the ESA. Second, Justice Breyer’s opinion also
affirms the ripeness o f claims for injuries that are not contingent on a timber sale, or some
other activity that requires a second stage of decision making.
However, it is doubtful that challenges to LRMPs based on such claims will result
in wholesale review of the entire plan. Rather, language in Ohio Forestry along with
prior and subsequent cases suggest courts will review only portions of the plan with a
causal relationship to the harm. It should also be noted that Ohio Forestry and
subsequent cases treat ripeness as a prudential and discretionary limitation on the
justiciability of claims. Therefore, courts may vary in their application of the doctrine to
different LRMPs.
Cases interpreting Ohio Forestry have generally recognized that the prudential
concerns o f ripeness are satisfied both by challenges to procedural requirements and
claims o f imminent harm not contingent on the outcome of further agency
decisionmaking. These cases also demonstrate that courts give Ohio Forestry’s
requirement o f site-specific allegations of harm talismanic significance even in the
absence of a rational basis for such a requirement, and contrary to the language of Ohio
Forestry.
Application of the Ohio Forestry requirement of site-specific allegations is
unwarranted in challenges brought against the Forest Service for failure to properly
50
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follow or implement LRMP monitoring requirements, because such challenges are only
tangentially related to Ohio Forestry and are easily distinguishable for the simple fact that
they are not substantive challenges to forest plans. Reliance on Ohio Forestry in such
cases is problematic at best, and is likely to continue to lead to inconsistent and unfair
decisions like Ecology Center, and Peterson II.
If anything, Ohio Forestry and Lujan stand for the proposition that cases
regarding a failure to properly monitor or otherwise follow LRMP guidelines do not
require allegations of site-specific harm. While Ohio Forestry equated procedural
challenges with NEPA, subsequent cases have recognized that claims brought under
NFMA, FLPMA, and the ESA may also be procedural in nature. Ohio Forestry's
statement that challenges to an agency’s failure to follow procedural requirements are
necessarily ripe, assumes that such a failure constitutes a “final agency action” or an
action “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” for purposes of the APA.
Monitoring requirements, imposed by regulations implementing NFMA, and
forest plans prepared pursuant to those regulations, are essentially procedural
requirements. Like NEPA, monitoring requirements guarantee particular procedures, not
specific results. The injury inflicted by an agency’s failure to monitor is similar to the
Ninth Circuit’s description of injuries occasioned by a failure to follow NEPA
requirements - the risk that environmental impacts will be o v e r l o o k e d . I f the failure to
monitor is properly characterized as a procedural claim, Ohio Forestry and Lujan stand
for the proposition that site-specific allegations are unnecessary.
Absent the misplaced requirements of site-specific allegations of harm, Peterson
/, Martin, and ONRC demonstrate more workable resolutions of agencies’ failures to

Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1514.
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properly follow mandatory regulations. These decisions explicitly recognize that agency
decisions to ignore their own regulations are reviewable under the APA as final agency
actions or failures to act. However, the requirement of site-specific allegations are
unnecessary when the claim is properly characterized as procedural, because the failure to
follow procedure is the injury, and the results of the procedural misstep do not need to be
fleshed out to demonstrate harm. When a statute guarantees that certain information will
be considered in rendering a decision, failure to consider that information prior to the
decision is the illegal act and the resultant harm.
Further, when the missing information is ecological monitoring data, making
decisions without it will effect not only specific timber sales, but the entire forest
ecosystem. This is because information regarding species population in one area of a
forest should effect management decisions made elsewhere that also impact that species.
For example, monitoring data which chronicles the effect of a certain management
decision on a species in one forest, should be considered in making a similar decision in
another forest, or even in different areas of the same forest. Also, a management decision
to allow limited destruction of a species’ habitat through timber harvest on one parcel of
land, would likely be different if population data showed that in fact the population
inhabiting another parcel o f suitable habitat was smaller in number, and the timber
harvest would constitute an impact on the overall population that the species may not
recover from.
On the other hand. Ecology Center and Peterson II represent overly restrictive
readings of Ohio Forestry that allow the Forest Service to ignore its own LRMPs and
thereby violate the sprit and letter of the environmental acts that require these plans to
guide all activities in our national forests. Until the effect of Ohio Forestry on such cases
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is clarified, environmental plaintiffs can protect their claims by including challenges to
site-specific actions. A requirement o f site-specific activity in these cases elevates form
over function and it is doubtful the Supreme Court intended such an interpretation or
result.
IV.

Standard of Review - Agency Deference and the Hard Look Doctrine
A.

Introduction

Even in cases where environmental plaintiffs’ failure to monitor claims have
surmounted the initial procedural hurdle regarding justiciability or ripeness, a second
hurdle remains —agency deference. Agency deference influences the standard o f review
or level of scrutiny that a court applies to challenged agency action or inaction.
Generally, the more deferential the standard, the harder it is for environmental plaintiffs
to prove to the reviewing court that the agency decision violates the applicable law or
regulation. However, even under the same standard o f review, courts have enough
wiggle room to come to different conclusions as to whether or not an agency action is
unlawful.
This chapter discusses the appropriate standard of review in monitoring cases.
The first section provides background information on the standard o f review and agency
deference. The second section examines the arbitrary and capricious standard, and how it
might apply to challenges regarding agency failures to gather appropriate population data.
In the third section, this chapter compares the two primary federal court cases addressing
the Forest Service’s failure to gather population data under the current NFMA
regulations. Finally this chapter concludes that even under the most deferential standard,
a failure to gather actual population data should itself be considered an unlawful decision,
and any timber harvest or other resource decision made in the absence of such data is also
53
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illegal.
B.

Background

In its 1984 opinion in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the long-standing conflict
concerning the proper scope of judicial review of agency interpretations of statutory
provisions.” " In Chevron, the Court announced a two-prong standard of review for
determining whether a federal agency’s interpretation and construction of a statute is
permissible.” ^ Under Chevron, courts must first determine whether Congress has
unambiguously expressed its intent on an interpretive issue.” ^ If the intent of Congress is
clear, then the court must give effect to that intent, because the courts must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”^’^ The second step provides that if
Congress was silent or ambiguous on an interpretive issue, a reviewing court must
exercise limited review and may not “simply impose its own construction on the statute
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.”^’* “Rather,”
the Court continued, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”” ’
Thus, the Chevron Court distinguished between two situations. In the first.
Congress explicitly directed the agency to promulgate regulations, by leaving a “gap” for
the agency to fill.” ’ When this occurs, “there is an express delegation o f authority to the

467 U .S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43.
^ Id. at 843.
* 7 /4.
* « / 4.

Id. at 843-44.
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agency to elucidate a specific provision o f the statute by regulation,” and “[s]uch
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”^®* The second situation occurs when Congress’s
legislative grant o f authority to an agency is “implicit rather than explicit.”^“ In that
case, the reviewing court must uphold the agency’s interpretation so long as it is
“reasonable.”^®^
As noted above, the statutory provisions which give rise to the Forest Service’s
duty to monitor species populations include certain provisions of NEPA and NFMA.
Both o f these statutes explicitly grant federal agencies the authority to promulgate
regulations to implement their provisions.^^ Thus, failure to monitor cases will generally
fit under the first situation in Chevron. Further, since neither NEPA, nor NFMA contain
provisions for judicial review, such review is accomplished through the APA, which
provides the standard o f review for agency actions is whether they are “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”^”^
Considering the foregoing, it is no surprise that federal courts review Forest
Service monitoring procedures under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. Despite the
broad discretion granted agencies under this standard, the arbitrary and capricious
standard o f review is not entirely toothless. Courts can and have held arbitrary and
capricious the Forest Service’s failure to gather actual population data, among other
inadequate agency procedures and decisions.

Id. at 844.
S ee supra notes 29-38 and accom panying text regarding NEPA; and notes 39-56 and accom panying text
regarding N FM A.
5 U .S.C . § 706(2){A ).
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C.

Arbitrary and Capricious - A Not-entirely-toothless Standard

In a line o f cases, beginning with Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the
Supreme Court delineated the scope o f this standard of review/^^ In Overton Park, the
Court was asked to scrutinize a decision by the Secretary o f Transportation to release
federal funds to the Tennessee highway department for construction of a six-lane
interstate highway through a Memphis public park.^®^ After finding that arbitrary and
capricious was the proper standard of review under the APA, the Court stated that the
presumption of the validity of the Secretary’s decision inherent in this standard “is not to
shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.”^"® Rather, the Court found
the APA required determination o f “whether the decision was based on a consideration o f
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error o f judgment.”^®^ The Court
continued that “this inquiry into the facts is to be searching an careful.”^'®
This explanation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, and the
requirement that an agency consider detailed information, came to be known as the “hard
look” doctrine after the Supreme Court decided Kleppe v. Sierra Club in 1976/" In
Kleppe, the Court considered whether the Department o f the Interior and other federal
agencies should have to prepare a region-wide, comprehensive environmental impact
statement prior to allowing development o f coal reserves on federally owned or

*“ 401 U .S. 4 0 2 (1 9 7 1 ).
Id.
*“ M. at 415.
Id. at 4 1 6 (internal citations omitted).
Id
*" 427 U .S. 3 90 (1976). Judge Leventhal is given credit for formulation o f the doctrine stating that a court
must “satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion with reasons that do not deviate
from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent. S ee Harold Leventhal, Environm ental D ecisionm aking
a n d the R ole o f the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. R ev. 509, 514 (1974) (quoting Greater Boston T elevision Corp.
V. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C.Cir. 1970)).
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controlled land in the Northern Great Plains/'^ The Court said that it should not
substitute its judgment for that o f the Agency, but should “insure that the agency has
taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences.”^’^
In 1983, the Supreme Court further fleshed out the hard look doctrine and scope
o f review o f agency actions.^"’ Agency actions are unlawful under the arbitrary and
capricious standard if the agency “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,”
has “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency,” or has not articulated “a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.”^'^
While hard look review has gained general acceptance in federal courts, it is not
without its detractors. One commentator suggested that “techno-bureaucratic rationality,’
rather than “comprehensive analytical rationality,” is the appropriate mode of
decisionmaking for agencies as well as corporations, and that “hard look” review is
inconsistent with this mode o f decisionmaking.^ ^ This commentator believes that “hard
look” review aims for an ideal o f “comprehensive analytical rationality” that is
impossible for an agency to achieve, due to “inadequate data, unquantifiable values,
mixed societal goals, and political realities.”^’’
Other commentators recognize the difficulties presented by such pragmatic

Id.
Id. at 4 1 0 n.21 (quoting Natural Resources D efense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
Motor V ehicle Mfr. A s s ’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U .S. 29 (1983).
I d at 43.
Mark Seidenfeld, H ard Look R eview in a W orld o f Techno-Bureaucratic Decisionm aking: A R eply to
P rofessor M cG arity, 75 TEX. L REV. 559, 559-60 (1997) (citing Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the
O ssification o f Rulemaking: A R esponse to P rofessor Seidenfeld, 75 T e x . L . R e v . 525, 537-39 (1997)
(stating that the evidentiary requirements w hich must be satisfied for agencies to satisfy hard look review
prevents agencies from taking a techno-bureaucratic approach - one that em phasizes political as w ell as
scientific considerations)).
Id. at 563.
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constraints, but also recognize that “hard look” review is essential to help agencies make
appropriate decisions in spite o f such pressures.^'* Hard look review can help agencies
recognize that its choices often involve values, and can help avoid taking inappropriate
shortcuts to satisfy value judgm ents/'^ Active judicial review o f an agency’s
decisionmaking process can also give agency staff the incentive and power to resist
political pressure from superiors to reach preordained results/^^ It can force
consideration o f concerns voiced by those outside the lead agency, like other agencies
and public interest g r o u p s . I t can force the agency to consider other alternatives or
different decisional criteria, to ask whether additional data or analysis is necessary, and to
consult with those who might not share its “potentially provincial professional
perspective.”^^^
Adding to the debate regarding the propriety of current embodiment o f the hard
look doctrine, others argue that courts should extend the doctrine to include evaluation of
the accuracy and integrity o f the scientific evidence considered in agency decisions.^^^
Examining the issue in the NEPA context, one commentator suggested that federal courts
can and should conduct such evaluations, given the CEQ regulation’s requirement that
agencies rely on high-quality s c i e n c e , a n d the Supreme Court’s express recognition, in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

of the judicial duty to evaluate the

Id. at 563-66.
at 565.
Id.
Id. Seidenfeld goes on to chronicle evidence that hard look review provides these benefits. Id. at 565-

68.
S ee Patricia Smith King, A pplyin g D au bert to the "Hard Look" Requirem ent o f NEPA: Scientific
E vidence Before the F orest Service in Sierra Club v. M arita, 2 WlS. E n v t l. L. J. 147, 156 (1995).
S ee supra note 38 and accom panying text. N FM A also contains provisions intended to promote use o f
up-to-date and high-quality science. See supra note 48 and accom panying text.
113 S. Ct. 2 7 8 6 (1 9 9 3 ).
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admissibility of scientific evidence/^''
For years, general acceptance was the only criterion used by courts in evaluating
scientific evidence/^^ In Daubert, the Court held this judicially created test was
superceded by the adoption o f the Federal Rules o f Evidence, and interpreted those rules
to require additional considerations, including; testability, peer review and publication,
and known or potential rate o f error.^^* These guidelines are flexible, based on the
scientific method, and intended for courts to use in assessing whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying proffered evidence is scientifically valid (i.e. reliable), and
whether it can be applied to the facts in issue (i.e. relevant).^^’
Though Daubert addressed the proper standard for admissibility of scientific
testimony at trial, some argue the same standard can and should be applied to the
question o f the validity o f scientific evidence before an administrative a g e n c y . T h e last
o f the Daubert criteria, known or potential rate of error, goes primarily to questions
concerning the reliability o f specific measurement techniques, and could be readily
applied to assess the reliability of the Forest Service’s habitat viability analysis, compared
to that o f the more traditional methods of population viability analysis. Despite
numerous federal court opinions stating that judges do not have the requisite expertise to
evaluate agency choices o f methodology, the Court in Daubert said, “we are confident
that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.”^^' Indeed, as the
following section will show, some federal judges have done just that.
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K ing, supra note 321 at 156.
Frye v. United States, 239 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C . Cir. 1923).
113 S. Ct. at 2786, and 2796-97.
Id. at 2796-97.
1
King, supra note 321 at 153.
D aubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
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D.

Deference in Species Monitoring Cases
1.

Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest
Service

In 1996, Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Service
directly confronted the Ninth Circuit with the question of whether habitat viability
analysis satisfied NFMA’s biodiversity requirement, or whether collecting and
monitoring actual population data was needed.” ^ The case arose in the Kootenai National
Forest in northwestern Montana, when the Forest Service produced an EIS and Biological
Opinion addressing the effects of eight timber sales on the surrounding environment and
resident wildlife, and subsequently approved the sales, all without gathering actual
population data.^” After unsuccessful administrative appeals, the environmental group
filed suit and lost when the district court granted summary judgment to the Forest
Service, characterizing the case as a dispute over the agency’s choice of scientific
methodology/^'* The environmental groups appealed claiming that the agency’s failure to
collect actual population data violated NFMA and section 219.19 of the implementing
regulations.^^^
The Ninth Circuit recognized that while 219.19 applies to forest planning rather
than site-specific management activities, the site-specific activities must comply with the
forest plan.” ^ Using the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court said it
would uphold the agency’s use of habitat viability analysis unless it was “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent” with section 219.19.^^’ The court also stressed that it would
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88 F.3d 754 (9'" Cir. 1996)
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 760,
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not overturn this approach even if another may have been preferable.” *
Thus under the banner of agency deference, the court allowed the Forest Service
to rely on the broad assumptions underlying habitat viability analysis, finding that
analysis which “uses all the scientific data currently available is a sound one.”” ® The
court based this finding on the plaintiffs admission that alternative approaches can be
used where population-specific information is not available, and on a Ninth Circuit
decision upholding a viability analysis that was “based on the current state of scientific
knowledge.”” ®
The court then addressed the application of section 219.19 to management
indicator species (MIS), misstating that section’s requirement of selection of appropriate
MIS as permissive.” ' However, the court did quote language fi-om section 219.19(a)(2)
which obligates the agency to evaluate management alternatives’ effects on population
trends^"*^ - an obligation that cannot be fulfilled without actual population data. The court
continued that it did not believe the Forest Service acted arbitrarily or capriciously when
it estimated the effects of the alternatives on the population o f MIS by analyzing the
effect of the alternative on MIS habitat.” ^
Taking this stretch a step further, the court finds the same analysis supports the
conclusion that the Forest Service satisfied its obligations under section 219.19(a)(6),
which states that “[pjopulation trends of the [MIS] will be monitored and relationships to
habitat determined.”'*” In so ruling, the court relies on the agency’s finding that there is

Id. at 761 n. 8.
Id. at 762 (citing Seattle Audubon S o c’y v. M oseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9* Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763.
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no technically reliable and cost-effective method of counting individual members of
species like the pileated woodpecker. Impl i edl y recognizing the mandatory nature of
the duty to monitor MIS populations under section 219.19, the court concludes that “[i]n
light o f the Service’s alternative method of population trend analysis, its failure to
monitor the actual population of the pileated woodpecker is not dispositive or
unreasonable.”^'*^
There are several flaws in the reasoning of the Inland Empire court. First, the
court upholds as reasonable the assumption underlying habitat viability analysis, without
any supporting evidence that wildlife populations remain viable in the face of widespread
timber harvesting simply because a number of trees are left standing.^"*’ This runs
contrary to the hard look doctrine’s requirement that an agency support it’s decision with
a rational connection to known facts.
Second, despite the courts misstatement as to the permissiveness of the MIS
requirement, the opinion seems to recognize the mandatory nature of gathering actual
population data once MIS are selected. However, the court allows the agency to shirk
this duty on the basis of an unsupported Forest Service finding that there is no reliable or
cost-effective method for counting MIS like the one chosen in this case - the pileated
woodpecker. The assertion that there was no reliable method to count these animals in
1996 is highly suspect. Further, nothing in the regulations suggests cost-effectiveness
should affect this duty. Besides, the fact remains that there was no support for these
assertions, again contrary to the hard look requirement.
Finally, the characterization of the agency’s habitat viability analysis as being

Id.
347

See Orlemann, supra note 23 at 365.
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based on the “current state of scientific knowledge” suggests that this is the best the
agency can do —another dubious assertion. The court also seems to place some emphasis
on the fact that because actual population data is not currently available, use of habitat
viability analysis, based on readily available information, is reasonable. The reasoning is
circular, finding that the agency’s failure to gather the actual population data justifies
their continuing failure to gather that same data.
2.

Sierra Club v. Martin

Martin, like Inland Empire, involved an appeal of a district court decision which
granted summary judgment to the Forest Service, holding that the agency was not
required under section 219.19 to collect actual population data before approving specific
timber sales, and therefore, that the Forest Service did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously.^^* On appeal, the Sierra Club argued that in conducting the biological
evaluation (BE) and environmental analysis (EA) for the proposed timber sales, the
Forest Service was required by the forest plan and its own regulations to collect baseline
population data on proposed, endangered, threatened and sensitive species of plants and
animals (PETS species).^"’ Sierra Club also argued that the decision to approve the sales
violated sections 219.12, 219.19, and 219.26 of the implementing regulations, because
the Forest Service laeked the population data required by those regulations as welL*^*^
In response to the first argument, the Forest Service acknowledged that PETS
species do occur within the project areas and that individuals would be destroyed by
timber harvest.*^' The agency argued that because those species also exist elsewhere

^ M artin, 168 F.3d at 3, See supra notes 207-25 and accompanying text for additional facts and
procedural background.

Id. at 4.

63
R e p ro d u c e d with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

within the forest, the timber sales would not significantly impact the species’ diversity or
v i a b i l i t y T h e court notes that the Service reached this conclusion without gathering
any inventory or population data on many PETS species, and that nothing in the record
indicated that the agency possessed baseline population data from which to measure the
impact destruction of PETS species in the project area would have on overall
populations.^”
Responding to the Forest Service’s request that the court defer to its conclusion
that the timber sales will not have a significant impact on PETS species populations, the
court states that it cannot do so absent support in the record for these assertions.” '* The
court continues, stating that in this case the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
that it failed to “examine relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action, including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”’” ^
Further, the court found that contrary to the agency’s argument, the forest plan does
require collection o f population inventory information, and that the information the
Service deems “adequate,” is actually “no information at all in terms of many of the
PETS species.”” * Since the agency’s position was contrary to the clear language of the
plan, the court found that it was entitled to no deference at all.^”
The court then considered the Sierra Club’s argument that approval of the timber
sales violated NFMA’s implementing regulations because the Forest Service failed to
collect actual population data for MIS (as required by section 219.19), and for “all

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 4-5.
at 5.
(quoting M otor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass
at 5.

463 U.S. at 43).

" 'A t
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affected species” (as required by sections 219.26 and 219.12).^^® The agency countered
that the section 219.19 does not explicitly require the agency to gather data on MIS,
merely to monitor population trends and determine relationships to habitat changes.®^’
Also, the Service contended that to interpret sections 219.26 and 219.12 to require data be
kept on “all affected species” makes nonsense out the concept of MIS.
The court agreed with the Forest Service that the regulations, when read together,
require only collection of inventory data on MIS.®*’ However, the court found the
Service’s argument actual population data was not required to be inconsistent with the
plain language of the regulations, stating that “[i]t is implicit that population data must be
collected before it can be monitored and its relationships determined,” and that before
inventories of quantitative data can be used to evaluate the effect of management
alternatives on forest diversity (as required by section 219.26), those inventories “have to
be collected.”®*® To read these regulations otherwise, the court noted, would be to rob
them of all meaning, contrary to the established rules of statutory construction.®*®
In finding the agency’s failure to gather actual population data on MIS violated
sections 219.19 and 219.26, the court quoted Sierra Club v. Glickman to support the
position that “[t]he unambiguous language of the MIS regulations requires collection of
population data.”®*^ In a footnote, the court stated that “we respectfully differ with Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion in Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 761, that habitat analyses suffice to
satisfy the requirements of 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 . . . which requires evaluation o f ‘both

Id. at 5-6. See supra note 49 and accompanying text regarding the 219 regulations.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7 (citing Scott v. City o f Hammond, Ind., 741 F.2d 992, 998 (7'*' Cir. 1984) (noting a strong
presumption against agency interpretation that renders a statute “wholly ineffective”)).
Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F.Supp. 905, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
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amount and quality of habitat and of animal population trends of the

The

Martin court did recognize, however, that in Inland Empire, the Forest Service had
conducted a more in-depth EIS and “detailed field studies,” as opposed to the less
involved EA and BE conducted in this case.^^

In concluding that Forest Service

approval of timber sales without gathering and considering population data on MIS is
arbitrary and capricious, the court stated that since the agency had no population data for
half o f the MIS in the forest, it could not “reliably gauge the impact of the timber projects
on these species.”^^^
In Martin, the Eleventh Circuit addressed and corrected many of the
shortcomings, as discussed above, in the Ninth Circuit’s Inland Empire decision.
Primarily, Martin's reading of the regulations is more logical, recognizing that their plain
language requires collection of actual population data, and without it, the regulations are
meaningless and their purpose is frustrated. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes
that the hard look doctrine mandates that an agency articulate a reasoned and supportable
basis for its management decisions, and that a decision made in the absence of data to
support it, is unreasonable.^^*
3.

Sierra Club v. Glickman (affirmed by Peterson I)

Sierra Club v. Glickman {Glickman), the predecessor of the Peterson decisions,
involved the environmental group’s challenge to Forest Service management practices in
Texas’s national f o r e s t s . A m o n g numerous complaints was the plaintiffs’ contention
that the Forest Services habitat viability approach and consequent failure to gather actual

Id. at n. 10.
“ ’ M at 7.
368
See Orlemann, supra note 23 at 370.
Glickman, 974 F.Supp. at 911.
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population data was arbitrary and capricious and not in compliance with NFMA’s
diversity provision or the implementing regulations under section 219.^™ In what is by
far the most exhaustive treatment of this issue in a federal court decision or elsewhere, the
court finds for the plaintiffs and enjoins the agency from conducting friture timber harvest
until further order of the court/^'
In rendering its decision, the court first finds that section 219.19 mandates both
selection of MIS and monitoring of their populations.^’^ The court also finds that an
interpretation of the regulations “requiring collection of population data [is] consistent
with the NFMA that requires collection of inventory data.”^’^ The Forest Service’s
interpretation of section 219.19, the court notes, requires only habitat for MIS, rather than
collection o f population data on MIS.^’'' Then the court recognized Inland Empire's
validation of that interpretation, stating, “[t]he court reasoned that the Forest Service’s
central assumption was reasonable, i.e., that ‘maintaining the acreage of habitat necessary
for survival would in fact assure [sic] a species’ s u r v i v a l . T h e Glickman court
expressly disagreed with Inland Empire, stating that the “decision does not support the
Forest Service’s interpretation,’’ and that “the assumption that merely providing habitat
will ensure viable populations of MIS and relieve the Forest Service of collecting
population data is not reasonable.’’^’^ While scientific analysis requires making certain

/(/. at 931-46.
Id. at 936-37 (quoting 36 C.F.R § 219.19(a)(1) “In order to estimate the effects o f each alternative on
fish and wildlife populations, [MIS] . . . shall be identified and selected. . . and 36 C.F.R. 219.19(a)(6)
“Populations trends o f the [MIS] will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes identified.”).
Id. at 937 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(2)(B); and Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F.Supp. 1291,
1316 (W .D. Wash. 1994) a f f d sub nom. Seattle Audubon S oc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (stating that
“[t]he viability regulation [section 219.19] requires the agencies to look to species populations - not
merely to habitat for hypothetical populations.”)).
372

Id. (quoting Inland Empire 88 F.3d at 761).
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assumptions, noted the court, “the scientific method requires testing and verification of
those assumptions from time to time,” and “[cjontinually testing assumptions upon which
forest management decisions are based is exactly what Congress had in mind when it
required the Forest Service to collect inventory data.”^’’
The court based its disapproval of this use of habitat viability analysis in part on
the Agency’s own communications regarding the methodology. The Forest Service’s
1992 Five Year Review discusses HABCAP,” * the computer model on which habitat
viability analysis depends, and reads;
* * Important Note: HABCAP does not or should not be used to derive
wildlife target projections, populations, or estimates. Many other factors
effect populations that are not considered within HABCAP. HABCAP
merely serves to assess the potential for specific population based on
habitat availability in an area. The value of actual population monitoring
for effectiveness or validation of assumptions in land management cannot
be stressed enough as its importance in the overall [management indicator]
process. 379
This same review stated that “HABCAP detects trends in habitat capability but not
population or population trends,” and an EIS prepared for the forest in 1996 noted that
these models “track capability rather than presence.”^**’
The court determined that the Forest Service’s interpretation of section 219.19 is
“plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulation itself and section 1604(g)(2)(B)”
of NFMA.^*' In order to comply with its statutory mandate and act within its discretion
in evaluating diversity, the court finds that the Forest Service must adequately inventory
and monitor properly selected MIS, as well as tree and plant species, if not adequately

Id.
HABCAP, an acronym for habitat capability, is a computer generated model that utilizes habitat
management and condition to assess the capability o f the forest to support certain species that require a
readily definable forest type and age class. Id. at 932.
I d at 932-33.
I d at 933.
Id. at 938.
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represented among
On appeal in Peterson I, the Forest Service argued that the fact finding done by
the Glickman court was improper and that the court had improperly engaged in de novo
review.^®^ Fifth Circuit upheld the Glickman decision, finding that the district court
correctly employed the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, that its conduct of
additional fact-finding was proper, and that its decision was warranted by the facts/®''
When Peterson / was reheard en banc and vacated, the Peterson //court decided the case
on the procedural issue of ripeness, and thus never reached or discussed the holdings of
Peterson I or Glickman regarding the monitoring issue/®^
4.

ONRC V. United States Forest Service

Regarding the standard of review, ONRC recognized that while an agency action
is presumptively valid and that substantial deference is afforded to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations, the court should not defer to an agency interpretation
that contradicts the plain language of a regulation/®^ In this case, as in Martin, Glickman,
and Peterson I, the monitoring requirements in the plan were found to be plain and
unambiguous, and the agencies’ failures to follow them were held unlawful/®’
£.

Conclusion

Though review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is often viewed as
fatal, per se, to plaintiffs claims, the cases above demonstrate that the standard does have
teeth and can overturn an agency decision that conflicts with its statutory mandate. Such
is the case with regards to monitoring requirements. The better reasoned cases hold that
Id.
Peterson /, 185 F.3d at 368.
Peterson II, 228 F.3d at 570.
Id. at 1090(citing Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
Id.
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the plain language o f section 219.19, especially when read in the context of other 219
regulations, NFMA and the purpose o f the statute, requires that actual population data be
collected. Without it, the Forest Service will not be able to determine the actual effects of
its management activities on resident wildlife.
On the other hand, courts that have deferred to Forest Service claims that habitat
viability analysis serves the same purpose and is allowed under the regulations, ignore the
requirement of the hard look doctrine that an agency have a reasonable factual basis for
its determinations. In the cases that allow habitat viability analysis, the Agency does not
supply and the court does not require support for the Service’s assertions. Indeed,
Glickman suggests this is because the Forest Service itself recognizes that habitat
viability analysis was not intended or effective as a substitute for gathering actual
population data. The often criticized concept o f MIS is itself a rather large assumption, to
stack an even larger assumption, habitat viability analysis, on top of that, renders
decisions made with these tools highly speculative at best.
V.

Conclusion
The success o f judicial challenges attempting to force the Forest Service to

adequately perform the species surveying and monitoring requirements contained in
federal envirorunental laws, regulations and individual forest plans has been inconsistent,
but the better reasoned cases have surmounted the two primary barriers to judicial
enforcement of monitoring requirements.
First, Martin, Peterson I and OA%C rightly recognize the judicial doctrine of
ripeness and the associated requirement of final agency action are satisfied when agencies
ignore procedural information gathering steps intended to guide their decisions.
However, these opinions still fail to recognize that site-specific allegations, intended to
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demonstrate harm to the court, are unnecessary when the injury is to a procedural right.
This is especially true in the case of a failure to monitor, which should impact decisions
throughout the plamiing area. Agency noncompliance with species monitoring
requirements is ripe for judicial review as final agency actions or failures to act
Second, Martin, Glickman, Peterson I and ONRC properly apply the standard of
review, the concept of agency discretion, and the hard look doctrine. While these
decisions recognize the degree to which a court must defer to a land management
agency’s scientific expertise and its interpretation of its regulations, they require that
agency decisions regarding scientific methods have some support and that an agency
interpretation of its own regulations have a reasonable basis in the language and purpose
o f regulations. While an agency is entitled to deference in interpreting and carrying out
these regulations, an agency’s failure to collect the required data is contrary to the law and
renders arbitrary and capricious any decision based on inadequate data.
Though the success of the these challenges in federal courts has been inconsistent,
judicial enforcement of monitoring requirements is legally and scientifically supportable,
and remains a viable method to ensure that federal agencies make fully informed resource
development decisions that consider and protect habitat, species, and biodiversity on our
public lands. To this end, the agency must monitor both management indicator species
numbers, and demographic rates, as well as habitat quantity and quality. Monitoring is
required by NFMA and its attendant regulations, and this requirement should be enforced
by courts.
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